

Islamophobia, Antisemitism, Zionism, Settler Colonialism⁽¹⁾

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Abstract: This paper discusses Islamophobia and its relationship with antisemitism in the context of the radical European right's recent shift towards pro-Israel positions and away from its traditional antisemitism. While this shift also has US and Australian manifestations, this paper emphasizes the foundational role colonial and settler colonial imaginaries play in the dynamic relationship between these forms of prejudice. It also suggests that current Islamophobic utterances can be seen as surrogate antisemitism.

Islamophobia

Antisemitism

Zionism

Settler Colonialism

Introduction

Islamophobia and antisemitism are related — there is by now a substantial comparative literature dedicated to their relationship. Some scholars appraise the two phobias in a register of similarity, or with a combination of both similarity and difference.⁽³⁾ The two approaches are radically different — they serve different political purposes. Celebrated historian Enzo Traverso, who wrote extensively about antisemitism, recently appraised them in a comparative vein.⁽⁴⁾ Similarly, introducing a special issue of *Ethnic and*

Racial Studies dedicated to the two phobias Nasar Meer argued in 2013 for "harnessing the explanatory power of long-established organizing concepts within the study of race and racism".⁽⁵⁾ The topic also features prominently in public discourse, and London Mayor Sadiq Khan, for example, recently adopted a comparative approach.⁽⁶⁾ Alternatively, some scholars and commentators have emphasised difference. In these instances, comparisons between the two prejudices are foreclosed.⁽⁷⁾

1 This study was originally published in Issue 38 (October 2021) of *Omran*, a quarterly peer-reviewed journal of social sciences and humanities.

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3 See: James Renton & Ben Gidley (eds.), *Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Europe: A Shared Story?* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan 2017). Maryyum Mehmood focuses on the effects of both prejudices on collective self-esteem and compares antisemitism in the Weimar Republic and Islamophobia in contemporary Britain. She notes that Muslims are not "Europe's 'new Jews'", a notion that "would belittle the historical contingencies of the past, and disregard the uniqueness of historical antisemitism and contemporary Islamophobia respectively", but finds that the targeted communities are affected in similar ways. See: "Paths from the past: historians make sense of Brexit and our current political turmoil," *The Guardian*, 30/3/2019, accessed on 15/5/2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3G1cOQx>; Maryyum Mehmood, "The Role of Self-Esteem in Understanding Anti-Semitic and Islamophobic Prejudice", in: Yasir Suleiman (ed.), *Muslims in the UK and Europe, I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 150-158.

4 Enzo Traverso, "Islamophobia: The New Western Racism," *Pluto Books*, accessed on 15/5/2022, at: <https://bit.ly/38xCKGR>

5 Nasar Meer, "Racialization and Religion: Race, Culture and Difference in the Study of Antisemitism and Islamophobia," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 36 (2013), pp. 385-398.

6 See: Sadiq Khan, "May's failure to tackle Tory Islamophobia sends a dangerous message," *The Guardian*, 2/4/2019, accessed on 15/5/2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3wqEk5j>; Sadiq Khan, "It is devastating that Jewish people feel Labour will not fight antisemitism," *The Guardian*, 24/2/2019, accessed on 15/5/2022, at: <https://bit.ly/37LK8OH>

7 Matti Bunzl, for example, argues "against the common impulse to analogize anti-Semitism and Islamophobia", and offered instead "an analytic framework that locates the two phenomena in different projects of exclusion". For him, "[a]nti-Semitism was invented in the late 19th century to police the ethnically pure nation-state", while "Islamophobia, by contrast, is a formation of the present, marshalled to safeguard a supranational Europe". Matti Bunzl, "Between Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Some Thoughts on the New Europe," *American Ethnologist*, vol. 32, no. 4 (2005), pp. 499-508. See also: Sipco Vellenga, "Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in the Netherlands: concepts, developments, and backdrops," *Journal of Contemporary Religion*, vol. 33, no. 2 (2018), pp. 175-192; Paul A. Silverstein, "The context of antisemitism and Islamophobia in France," *Patterns of Prejudice*, vol. 42, no. 1 (2008), pp. 1-26.

The former interpretative structure is typically mobilised to denounce both prejudices; the latter is either mobilised to emphasise different historical contingencies, something the comparativists would not disagree with, or to state or imply that one form of stigmatisation is more acceptable than the other, or even that one is acceptable while the other is not, something the comparativists would definitely oppose. Either way, whether they are deemed comparable or not, the question of their reciprocal relation emerges.

The Question of Correlation

The comparativists remark that the two prejudices operate in *functionally* similar ways. They are both ancient prejudices and each has a complex and distinct multi-century European history. Both antisemitism during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century and Islamophobia in more recent decades grew during times of profound socioeconomical crisis and in the presence of sustained migratory flows. Based on this functional similarity, they can and have been compared. Moreover, both phobias identify an unassimilable alien agency that has entered an imagined national or cultural space and will remain forever alien. They also both rely on similar allegations concerning conspiracies ordained by the "usual suspects" of conspiracy paranoid thought: the "global", "cosmopolitan", left-wing elites, a liberal "cabal", etc. Historic and contemporary examples abound. In 1905, the *Protocol of the Elders of Zion* alleged a conspiracy to take over the world and establish a "new global order" (that fake news is a new phenomenon is itself fake news). Similarly, contemporary Islamophobes see all Muslims as part of a transnational *Ummah* (brotherhood) that aims to subvert the whole "Western civilisation".⁽⁸⁾ A

This paper explores current mobilisations of these phobias and develops three arguments: the first section observes how one is often embraced as the other is dismissed; the second section reflects on the ways in which these phobias are understood as place-specific; while the third section appraises the imaginative geographies that sustain these phobias. Following on from the previous two, the latter argument focuses on the foundational role colonial and settler colonial imaginaries play in these phobic manifestations. Settler colonial imaginings still crucially shape public sensitivities, and it is important that we focus on these imaginaries.

widespread story that yokes these hatreds together alleges that "the Jews" are deliberately promoting the migration of Muslims to Europe in order to destroy its Christian stability and identity. These racisms typically confuse culture, ethnicity and religion and both predictably raise the issue of questionable loyalty to national and cultural communities. Both Islamophobia and antisemitism especially question their targets' loyalty.

A call for solidarity in the face of parallel hatreds was issued in 2019 by journalists Jonathan Freedland and Mehdi Hasan, who note that both "communities are under attack from far-right white supremacists".⁽⁹⁾ The supremacist narrative is usually constructed, they add, around images of a Muslim invasion, "a wicked plot orchestrated by the same hidden hand behind all malign events through world history: the Jews".⁽¹⁰⁾ "This is how our haters see us", Freedland and Hasan continued:

Jews and Muslims connected in a joint enterprise to effect a 'white genocide.' It is an unhinged and racist conspiracy theory – and it has both of our communities in its murderous sights. So there can only be one response:

8 For a comparative introduction to the Western politics of Islamophobia, see: Abe W. Ata (ed.), *Muslim Minorities and Social Cohesion: Cultural Fragmentation in the West* (London: Routledge, 2020).

9 Jonathan Freedland & Mehdi Hasan, "Muslims and Jews face a common threat from white supremacists. We must fight it together," *The Guardian*, 4/4/2019, accessed on 15/5/2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3lhfl9S>. Freedland has in recent years consistently (and much less convincingly) argued that contemporary antisemitism comes from the left.

10 Ibid.

Muslims and Jews must stand and fight it together.⁽¹¹⁾

Freedland and Hasan cited a Pew survey of European countries and pointed out that "these two hatreds are linked on the right", and "not only in the minds of deranged killers".⁽¹²⁾ The report found that "attitudes toward Jews and Muslims are highly correlated with each other", and that people "who express negative opinions about Muslims are more likely than others to also express negative views of Jews".⁽¹³⁾ A 2010 Gallup study they also cited found that in the US people "who say they feel 'a great deal' of prejudice [...] toward Jews are about 32 times as likely to report feeling 'a great deal' of prejudice toward Muslims". The "kind of people who hate one of us are more likely to hate the other too", Freedland and Hasan concluded.⁽¹⁴⁾

And yet, while this call should be answered, the relationship between the two hatreds should be clarified, because even though these prejudices have emerged equally from the right and are an expression of related milieus, they are also often adopted selectively and at different times by different individuals and movements. Indeed, if the expression of these hatreds is analysed in its historical evolution, contrary to the conclusion reached in the report cited by Freedland and Hasan, we can see that the hatreds are often *negatively* correlated. In time, one hatred goes up (i.e., Islamophobia) as the other goes down (i.e., antisemitism). As this paper will outline in the next two sections, many European right-wingers vigorously embraced Islamophobia in recent decades as they abandoned traditionally antisemitic positions. True, they have issued over the years both antisemitic and Islamophobic tropes (which would confirm a correlation), but *not at the same time* (which indicates a negative correlation).

Many embrace both hatreds simultaneously and everywhere, but at times these hatreds are articulated in place-specific ways. Place is indeed a significant feature of these phobias' global negative articulation, and many (Viktor Orbán of Hungary for example) pursue an antisemitic agenda at home while supporting Israeli policies in the Middle East. Their antisemitism is place-specific, and so is their Islamophobia, which is expressed freely with reference to "home" but is forgotten when it comes to talking about other places (the West's concern about Chinese repression of Uyghur Muslims in Sinkiang comes to mind). A negative correlation, a correlation that coexists with the positive correlation Freedland and Hasan postulate, is confirmed by an analysis that is aware of the imaginative geographies mobilised in these contexts. It is important to note that Islamophobia at times *surrogates* for antisemitism — it often spreads when the other recedes, and it applies to locales where the other does not apply.

A number of Jewish intellectuals and commentators have even publicly supported Islamophobic sensitivities as they warned against resurgent antisemitism. Bat Ye'or, for example, the ideator of "Eurabia" — a crucial idea in Islamophobic thinking — has "traced" a "secret" recent history of Europe.⁽¹⁵⁾ In her reconstruction, which is a fully-fledged conspiracy theory, the Euro-Arab Dialogue initiated in the 1970s turned from an intergovernmental discussion group into a vehicle for "Islamisation". It is an entirely fictional proposition, and Israeli historian Robert Wistrich has insightfully called Ye'or's conspiracy "the protocols of the elders of Brussels".⁽¹⁶⁾ Wistrich was referring to an early twentieth century antisemitic hoax; but like its predecessor, the latter conspiracy has also gone mainstream.⁽¹⁷⁾ Alain Finkielkraut even praised Renaud Camus as a "great writer".⁽¹⁸⁾ Camus

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Bat Ye'or, *Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis* (Vancouver, BC: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2005).

16 See: Andrew Brown, "The myth of Eurabia: how a far-right conspiracy theory went mainstream," *The Guardian*, 16/8/2019, accessed on 15/5/2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3G1dW6J>

17 The Middle East Forum has dutifully followed the remarkable public life of this conspiracy theory. See their website: *Middle East Forum*, accessed on 15/5/2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3sCicUr>

18 Cited in: A. Dirk Moses, "'White Genocide' and the Ethics of Public Analysis," *Journal of Genocide Research* (2019), p. 12.

coined the notion of the "Great Replacement" — an alleged conspiracy ordained by cosmopolitan capital and the anti-racist left, and another crucial concept in Islamophobic discourse.

Camus has espoused both prejudices in his career, but did so at different times. In his writings, an original antisemitism turned eventually into Islamophobia. His journey has been replicated by many who have

expressed their anxious concerns for the sociocultural and civilisational integrity of their imagined polities vis-à-vis immigrants, and specifically Muslim immigrants. Camus is French, but in the United States, Islamophobic tropes are also routinely mobilised to argue against antisemitism.⁽¹⁹⁾ What appears at first as a correlation linking the two hatreds at times turns out to be a negative correlation mediated by anxieties about place.⁽²⁰⁾ Place matters.

Where is the Islamophobic/Antisemitic Self?

The imbrication of two phobias is a global phenomenon that has political, institutional, individual and media-facilitated manifestations. A glaring example of place-specific antisemitism in negative correlation with Islamophobia emerged in the US summer of 2019, when US President Donald Trump (2017-2021) provoked outcry by racially attacking four Democratic congresswomen and suggesting they should "return" where they came from.⁽²¹⁾ As well as daydreaming about actually deporting them, he also wished for them to move away from the imagined place he imagined sharing with his supporters. The following month, at the request of his administration, Israel denied two of them (Democratic Congresswomen Rashida Tlaib (2019-) and Ilhan Omar (2019-)) entry into the country. Responding to further outcry, Trump argued: "Where has the Democratic Party gone?" He then added: "Where have they gone where they are defending these two people [representatives Tlaib and Omar] over the state of Israel? And I think any Jewish people that vote for a Democrat, I think it shows either a total lack of knowledge or great disloyalty".⁽²²⁾

This was a remarkably antisemitic remark, as the possibility of questionable loyalty is a classic antisemitic trope. Trump then reiterated his point the following day.⁽²³⁾ He felt that the Democratic Party in its entirety had moved away from the imaginary place he was dwelling in.

Antisemitism is typically driven by anxious concerns about place, and Trump's antisemitism fits in with this pattern.⁽²⁴⁾ His use of "where" in the remarks cited above, a relative clause repeated three times in two lines, is indeed telling. In his framing, difference with his opinion spatially distances those who disagree with him (when he asks rhetorically "where has the Democratic Party gone?" he is signalling that he perceives it to be located *away* from his subject position). And yet, somewhat ironically, whereas he had previously argued that four democratic congresswomen should return "where" they are from (Tlaib, one of the women he attacked, is Palestinian-American), she was literally unable to even visit the country she is from at his own request (of course she is from Michigan too). The Democratic

19 See, for examples: Bari Weiss, *How to Fight Anti-Semitism* (New York: Penguin Random House, 2019); Deborah E. Lipstadt, *Antisemitism: Here and Now* (New York: Schocken, 2019). Weiss in particular deployed recognisably Islamophobic tropes as she emphasised the identity of Israel as a settler "America" and the US as a settler "Israel".

20 One is disavowed, while the other is relentlessly promoted. See: Nathan Lean, *The Islamophobia Industry: How the Right Manufactures Fear of Muslims* (London: Pluto Press, 2017).

21 Jon Swaine, "Trump renews racist attack on Squad: 'They're not capable of loving the US'," *The Guardian*, 22/7/2019, accessed on 15/5/2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3Mggobv>

22 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, "Trump Accuses Jewish Democrats of 'Great Disloyalty'," *The New York Times*, 20/8/2019, accessed on 15/5/2022, at: <https://nyti.ms/3lceflp>

23 See: Eileen Sullivan, "Trump Again Accuses American Jews of Disloyalty," *The New York Times*, 21/8/2019, accessed on 15/5/2022, at: <https://nyti.ms/3Podun2>

24 For an argument emphasising the evolution of antisemitism in relation to place, see: Patrick Wolfe, *Traces of History: Elementary Structures of Race* (London: Verso 2016).

Party is perceived as distant, but these women are perceived to be in a proximate position, and this prompted his discomfort. Hence, Trump demanded that they "return" wherever they once were and move away from him. It all suggests a worrying state of mind, suggesting a politics fundamentally shaped by a peculiar imaginary geography. Indeed, Trump's antisemitic and Islamophobic utterances were crucially space-specific: while identification with Israel displaces the self in a way that turns an original desire to send the women "back where they are from" into a determination to keep them where they are, the Democratic Party did not follow him to an imaginary place where Israel and the US occupy the same location. In narcissistic fashion, Trump then understood a determination not to follow him to this imaginary place as a betrayal.

A paranoid desire to control other people's movement follows — walls keep people out and in this instance of displaced Islamophobia imaginary walls can be used to keep people in (Tlaib and Omar are the two members of "the squad" to whom Islamophobia specifically applies). A sitting US president hurling racist insult at members of Congress is not unprecedented, but a sitting president effectively tampering with the ability of elected representatives to travel abroad is. This point was not prominent in the outflow of indignation that briefly followed Trump's utterances. In this instance race trumped attention to place. Then again, Trump's imaginative geography is peculiar but also not entirely unprecedented, and in a sense belongs to a venerable and long lasting Western political tradition. Nineteenth century British and American philosemites, for example, were also and simultaneously profoundly antisemitic. To articulate their place-specific antisemitism, they advocated for the establishment of a Jewish colony in Palestine, a place where the "Jews" could "go back where they were from". The "colony" would come, the *Yushuv* (which in Hebrew means "colony"). But

it wasn't just a colony; it was a *settler* colony. Then the *Yushuv* would become Israel, a settler society, but the imaginative geographies sustained by place-specific antisemitism via settler colonialism did not substantially change.⁽²⁵⁾

The link between settler colonialism and Jewish emancipation was recently explored by Ben Ratskoff, who highlighted Marx's "attention to the 'free states of North America'" in his 1844 *On the Jewish Question*, and Marx's intuition that only in the United States (as opposed to both France and Germany) could Jewish emancipation be complete. While Ratskoff dismantles "assumptions that antisemitism and white supremacy are necessarily isomorphic", he also remarks that "Trump's paradoxical proximity both to Jewish advisors, allies, and immediate family members and to antisemitic white nationalist movements confounds".⁽²⁶⁾ Ratskoff focuses on "public debate around Jewish whiteness", but this proximity does not confound if settler colonialism as a specific mode of domination and the imaginative geographies it engenders are taken into consideration. Jews are emancipated in the settler colony (as Marx realised they would) because, as Matthew Frye Jacobson remarked about US history (a point Ratskoff quotes), in practice, "what a citizen really was, at bottom, was someone who could help put down a slave rebellion or participate in Indian wars".⁽²⁷⁾ One is immediately assimilated *if* a society is defined by slavery and settler colonialism and one is *neither* a slave nor an indigenous person.

The turning point in these transitions from antisemitism to Islamophobia is support for Zionism and for the Israeli policies towards Palestinians under occupation.⁽²⁸⁾ It is significant that both Zionism and Islamophobia developed historically in a global context dealing with the contradictions of a specific diaspora's impossible national location. In the nineteenth century and during the twentieth century's first half it was the "Jewish question" and Zionism, during the second half of the twentieth century and today it is the "Palestinian

25 See: Gershon Shafir, *Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

26 Ben Ratskoff, "'Improbable Spectacles': White Supremacy, Christian Hegemony, and the Dark Side of the Judenfrage," *Studies in American Jewish Literature*, vol. 39, no. 1 (2020), pp. 17, 19.

27 Cited in: *Ibid.*, p. 30.

28 On the ways in which support for Palestinian self-determination is equated to antisemitism, see: Karl Sabbagh (ed.), *The Antisemitism Wars: How the British Media Failed Their Public* (Bloxham: Skyscraper Publications, 2018); Jewish Voice for Peace (ed.), *On Antisemitism: Solidarity and the Struggle for Justice* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2017).

question" and Islamophobia (even though Palestinians, of course, are not all Muslims). For many right-wingers, the journey away from antisemitism and towards Islamophobia transits through an embrace of Zionism. Zionism itself was (as well as a national

movement) a journey away from antisemitism. For those who are now embracing Islamophobia and place-specific antisemitism it is a metaphorical journey, for the European Zionists who went to Palestine during the twentieth century it was a literal one.

The Colonialism/Zionism Nexus

Enzo Traverso authoritatively supports a comparative analysis of the two prejudice systems. He points out that today "racism has changed its forms and its targets", that racialism, "a scientific discourse based on biological theories", has now "given way for a cultural prejudice that emphasises a radical anthropological discrepancy between 'Jewish-Christian' Europe and Islam", and that "the Muslim immigrant has replaced the Jew" in racist discourse.⁽²⁹⁾ Traverso understands Islamophobia and antisemitism as functionally related:

Anti-Semitism played the role of a 'cultural code' that allowed Germans to negatively define a national consciousness, in a country troubled by rapid modernisation and the Jewish concentration in the big cities, where they appeared as its most dynamic group. In other words, a German was first of all a non-Jew. In a similar way, today Islam is becoming a cultural code that allows one to find, by a negative demarcation, a lost French identity, threatened or engulfed in the process of globalisation.⁽³⁰⁾

However, he also detects a crucial distinction separating the two: colonialism. Traverso's comparative analysis in a register of similarity

then turns comparative in a register of difference. "Islamophobia is not a simple ersatz for the old anti-Semitism", he remarks, because:

its roots are old and it possesses its own tradition: colonialism. The roots of Islamophobia lie in the memory of the long colonial past of Europe and, in France, of the Algerian War. Colonialism formed a political anthropology based on the dichotomy between citizens and colonial subjects – citoyens and indigènes – that fixed social, spatial, racial and political boundaries [emphasis in original].⁽³¹⁾

And yet, colonialism and antisemitism are also crucially interwoven: Zionism, a most colonial enterprise since its inception (and today), was also and crucially a response to antisemitism.⁽³²⁾ It may not be a "simple ersatz", but colonial traditions do not render Islamophobia and antisemitism distinct hatreds — quite the opposite. If Zionism as a settler-colonial movement is added to the picture, and Traverso does not add it to the picture, the register remains one of similarity.⁽³³⁾ Moreover, the political anthropology of Zionism and that of colonialism overlap, are often undistinguishable, and the "social, spatial, racial and political boundaries"

29 Traverso.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Recent contestations regarding then British Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn's 2011 endorsement of John A. Hobson's 1902 *Imperialism: A Study* demonstrate how discussions of colonialism and imperialism and antisemitism have become fraught. The Corbyn detractors focused on a book by Hobson that Corbyn was not referring to, but while Hobson's language is undoubtedly antisemitic, he made abundantly clear that Rothschild was influentially promoting the Boer War because he was a banker and not because he was a Jew. See: "Corbyn criticised over book anti-Semitism row," *BBC News*, 1/5/2019, accessed on 15/5/2022, at: <https://bbc.in/38ugWMq>; "Jewish leaders demand explanation over Corbyn book foreword: Before becoming Labour leader he called 1902 book containing antisemitic tropes 'brilliant'," *The Guardian*, 1/5/2019, accessed on 15/5/2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3wtlBoD>. On the ways in which the British Labour Party became "antisemitic", See: Greg Philo et al., *Bad News for Labour: Antisemitism, the Party and Public Belief* (London: Pluto Press, 2019). Following a report by the Equality and Human Rights Commission, former Labour leader Corbyn was eventually suspended from the Party in late 2020. See: Jessica Elgot, "Labour reinstates Jeremy Corbyn after suspension over antisemitism remarks," *The Guardian*, 18/11/2020, accessed on 15/5/2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3FKz0ho>

33 On Israel as a settler society, see, for example: Lorenzo Veracini, "The Other Shift: Settler Colonialism, Israel, and the Occupation," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 42, no. 2 (2013), pp. 26-42; Lorenzo Veracini, "What Can Settler Colonial Studies Offer to an Interpretation of the Conflict in Israel-Palestine?," *Settler Colonial Studies*, vol. 5, no. 3 (2015), pp. 268-271. See also: Omar Jabary Salamanca et al. (eds.), Special Issue: "Past is Present: Settler Colonialism in Palestine," *Settler Colonial Studies*, vol. 2, no. 1 (2012).

separating Jews and Palestinians historically (and in contemporary Israel and the Occupied Territories) are as fixed as those of other colonial traditions. Colonialism shapes Zionism as much as Islamophobia is shaped by it, and keeping this shared genealogy in mind can help explain why so many European right-wingers could seamlessly transit from antisemitism to Islamophobia.

Leader of the French National Rally Marine Le Pen epitomises this transition: in 2017 she proactively distanced her political movement from traditional antisemitic positions as she became a vocal supporter of Israeli policies vis-à-vis the Palestinian population under occupation.⁽³⁴⁾ She could draw on a deeply entrenched and widespread archive of colonial structures of feeling, "repatriated" former settlers from Algeria were always overrepresented in the political outfit she inherited.⁽³⁵⁾ Leader of Italy's right Matteo Salvini similarly distinguished between the two hatreds in early 2020 (he dabbles in both). When interviewed about the ostensible resurgence of antisemitism in Italy he responded that in his opinion antisemitism was "due to the growth in recent years of Islamic extremism and fanaticism", and that the "massive presence of immigrants from Muslim countries contributes to the spread of anti-Semitism in Italy" (he then proclaimed that should he become Prime Minister he would recognise Jerusalem as Israel's capital).⁽³⁶⁾ Place specific antisemitism in a negative correlation with Islamophobia is clearly recognisable in his utterances. In a fundamental respect, however, these ideological travellers are being consistent: they consistently adopt a colonial worldview as they perceive a hardening global "line" separating coloniser and colonised. They do not actually travel much.

A further element informing these right-wingers' transition from antisemitism to Islamophobia should be considered: as the hardening global line they are drawing is underpinned by an imaginary geography that is obsessed with immigrants and their resettlements, they are differentiating between *settler-colonisers* and *settler-colonised*. This distinction is not underpinned generally by a colonial worldview; it is premised specifically on a *settler colonial* worldview. If "Europe" is constituted by the colonial relation and the contemporary settler societies are one result of a process of "Great Replacement", as these right wingers see Europe becoming engulfed in a putative process of "great replacement", they think of the settlers. The settler colonisers, after all, win by greatly replacing, and in the settler societies, including Israel, demographic replacement *is a celebrated process of national achievement and official policy*, not a conspiracy theory.⁽³⁷⁾ Paranoiac concerns about demography thus take two complementary and mutually reinforcing shapes: anxiety about the possibility of a "Great Replacement" being inflicted against one's fantasised polity on the one hand (that is, anxieties prompting Islamophobia in one place), and empathetic identification with an actual project of great replacement that is inflicted on a collective that is construed as intractably "other" (that is, an identification that prompts support for Islamophobic settler colonialism in Palestine).⁽³⁸⁾

For these right-wingers, including, for example, the Australian mass murderer who went on a killing rampage in Christchurch, New Zealand in March 2019, a "Great Replacement" is only a concern if one thinks he is on the wrong side of it.⁽³⁹⁾ The Christchurch murderer

34 See, for example: Itay Lotem, "In a bid to detoxify the far right, Marine Le Pen wants to appeal to French Jews", *The Conversation*, 22/3/2017, accessed on 15/5/2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3PkTPVc>

35 On the specifically colonial origins of European populism and nativism (rather than pointing out contemporary globalisations and austerity), see, for example: John W. P. Veugelers, *Empire's Legacy: Roots of a Far-Right Affinity in Contemporary France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).

36 Cited in: Kay Wallace, "Salvini would recognise Jerusalem as Israel's capital," *La Repubblica*, 20/1/2020, accessed on 15/5/2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3FJZH65>

37 This point is eloquently made in: Azeezah Kanji & David Palumbo-Liu, "Settler Colonialism Lurked Beneath the Christchurch Massacre," *Truthout*, 6/4/2019, accessed on 15/5/2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3ldllWU>. Kanji and Palumbo-Liu cite: Henry Reynolds & Marilyn Lake, *The Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the Question of Racial Equality* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2008), a crucial text in the consolidation of transnational settler colonial studies as a field of research.

38 Displacements like these go the other way round too. If supporting someone else's settler colonialism enables fantasies about being the victim of hidden conspiracies leading to "great replacements", then focusing on someone else's genocide enables obscuring your own. See: Jason Chalmers, "Settled Memories on Stolen Land: Settler Mythology at Canada's National Holocaust Monument," *The American Indian Quarterly*, vol. 43, no. 4 (2019), pp. 379-407.

39 The attacker called his "manifesto", which he published online before committing his act of mass murder, "The Great Replacement". See: Farhad Manjoo, "The White-Extinction Conspiracy Theory Is Bonkers: The New Zealand attacker wanted you to think white people face existential decline. They don't," *The New York Times*, 20/3/2019, accessed on 15/5/2022, at: <https://nyti.ms/38um9Uu>

was an Australian settler nationalist; he had radicalised while travelling through Europe, a traditional rite of passage for young Australians facing adult life. That he could express his settler nationalism in this way while in another settler country is testament to the complexities of a transnational settler-colonial mentality.

Australia is indeed another locale where a settler colonial history interacts with an Islamophobic present. It has become a veritable laboratory of global Islamophobic practices, even if Islamophobia is certainly not new in Australia (historical anxieties surrounding the presence of "Afghans" in its centre, and the foundational mythology of Anzac and Gallipoli are two constitutive moments in this history).⁽⁴⁰⁾ Islamophobia in Australia has been

crucial to a comprehensive political realignment that began in the early 2000s, a key ideological ingredient in the official discontinuation of multiculturalism and the implementation of what Scott Poynting and Victoria Mason have called the "new integrationism".⁽⁴¹⁾ Multiculturalism had replaced the White Australia policy during the 1970s, but Islamophobia is now one of White Australia's new discursive dresses (Sinophobia is another).⁽⁴²⁾ Besides, it was Australian soldiers who perpetrated the first settler colonial ethnic cleansing of a Palestinian village in the twentieth century, something that Zionist forces would practice on a much larger scale in the 1940s.⁽⁴³⁾ When the Australians did it, it was 1918, not 1948.

Palestinian Subjection as Antisemitism

"How did antisemitism get so strange?" Keith Kahn-Harris asks before concluding that "antisemitism has become selective" like other racisms also have.⁽⁴⁴⁾ It is a selection that revolves around place, and while attention to sequence suggests that antisemitism and Islamophobia are often negatively correlated, it is significant that this phobia more than others has become place-specific. Attention to place and sequence shows that the relationship between the two phobias is mediated by settler colonialism in general and by Zionist settler colonialism in particular (even if Islamophobia has other origins too, of course, as Junaid Rana, for example, has recently explored,

including white supremacy and racial liberalism).⁽⁴⁵⁾ Support for Zionism is one way in which one phobia transubstantiates into the other.

As we trace this transition, we should craft appropriate responses. In December 2019 President Trump issued an executive order upholding an "expanded" definition of antisemitism.⁽⁴⁶⁾ His immediate aim was to interfere with on-campus discussions of Israeli policies vis-à-vis the Palestinian population under occupation. Scholars should resent all interferences with academic freedom, but even if one is forced to adopt this "expanded" definition of antisemitism by

40 Scott Poynting, "Islamophobia Kills! But Where Does it Come From?," *International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy*, vol. 8, no. 4 (2019).

41 See: Linda Briskman, "The Creeping Blight of Islamophobia in Australia," *International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy*, vol. 4, no. 3 (2015), pp. 112-121; Scott Poynting & Victoria Mason, "The New Integrationism, the State and Islamophobia: Retreat from Multiculturalism in Australia," *International Journal of Law Crime and Justice*, vol. 36 (2008), pp. 230-246. On the historical evolution of Islamophobia in Australia, see also: Alice Aslan, *Islamophobia in Australia* (Sydney: Agora Press, 2009).

42 For a history of multicultural Australia, see, for example: Anthony Moran, *The Public Life of Australian Multiculturalism: Building a Diverse Nation* (Singapore: Springer, 2017).

43 On the Surafend massacre, when Australian and New Zealand soldiers removed all women and children from the Palestinian village of Surafend and then killed between 40 and 120 unarmed villagers, see: Paul Daley, *Beersheba: A Journey Through Australia's Forgotten War* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Publishing, 2009). This was not a war crime because the war was already over.

44 Keith Kahn-Harris, *Strange Hate: Antisemitism, Racism and the Limits of Diversity* (London: Watkins Media, 2019).

45 On the ways in which Islam and Muslims "are conjured as an object of white supremacy" and are "in a formation of racial becoming", see: Junaid Rana, "Anthropology and the Riddle of White Supremacy," *American Anthropologist* (2019), pp. 8, 10. Rana observes that as "culture has been imbued with racial ideas, so too has religion", (2) and that the "racial liberal is also settler colonial". (7) Rana sees the link between Islamophobia and settler colonialism as mediated by racial liberalism. I see it as mediated by settler-colonial Zionism. But the link is there. See also: Junaid Rana, "The Racial Infrastructure of the Terror Industrial Complex," *Social Text*, vol. 34, no. 4 (2016), pp. 111-138.

46 Erica L. Green, "Trump Order's Wider Definition of Judaism Aids Crackdown on Colleges," *The New York Times*, 11/12/2019, accessed on 15/5/2022, at: <https://nyti.ms/3PqGqv>

law, and it is a big if, and I do not personally see why right wing billionaires should be able to determine the parameters of admissible scholarly enquiry, I am talking about a Times New Roman 24 big if, one should still demand that the "expanded" definition be applicable to all "Semitic" peoples. Note the inverted commas: the notion of "Semitic" collectives is racist, Orientalist, and Eurocentric, but it applies to Palestinians and Jews equally.⁽⁴⁷⁾ Palestinians and Israelis both should enjoy the "inherent" right to self-determination this definition postulates.

Similarly, the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance states that "[d]enying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavour" is antisemitic.⁽⁴⁸⁾ Again, the terms of this definition and the advisability of relying on a single definition, or on that definition specifically, may be debated, and they have been, but surely there should be consistency.⁽⁴⁹⁾ According to these definitions, denying the Palestinian national collective's right to self-determination, as the Israeli Occupation of the Palestinian Territories inarguably does, is as antisemitic as it is Islamophobic.⁽⁵⁰⁾

The Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism that was issued in March 2021 offers a viable and less stifling alternative.⁽⁵¹⁾ It seeks to "provide a usable, concise, and historically informed core definition of antisemitism", and it "responds" to "the IHRA Definition", the "document that was adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) in 2016". So,

as well as an operational tool endowed with guidelines, it critiques a definition that is "unclear in key respects and widely open to different interpretations, it has caused confusion and generated controversy, hence weakening the fight against antisemitism". Specifically, the Jerusalem Declaration seeks to "protect a space for an open debate about the vexed question of the future of Israel/Palestine", a space that was dangerously and deliberately imperilled by the IHRA definition. The framers of the Jerusalem Declaration are therefore careful to insist that their definition of antisemitism must be "non-legally binding".

The framers of the Jerusalem Declaration are aware of recent debates about Israeli colonialism, settler colonialism, and apartheid. They add that "[c]riticizing or opposing Zionism as a form of nationalism, or arguing for a variety of constitutional arrangements for Jews and Palestinians in the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean" is not antisemitic. Likewise, they explicitly declare that "even if contentious, it is not antisemitic, in and of itself, to compare Israel with other historical cases, including settler-colonialism or apartheid". Then again, their insistence on an unspecified "principle of equality" may undo the productive and analytical labour offered by an emphasis on settler colonialism as a mode of domination. The rights of the Indigenous Palestinians should be seen as inherent and not subjected to the will of a majority of settlers. Seen in this light, paradoxically, even this definition may deprive a "Semitic" collective of its right to self-determine. It is what settler colonialism does.

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47 See: David Landy, Ronit Lentin & Conor McCharty (eds.), *Enforcing Silence: Academic Freedom, Palestine and the Criticism of Israel* (London: Zed Books, 2020).

48 See: "What is antisemitism? Non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism," *International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance*, accessed on 15/5/2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3Pzcj4z>

49 See: Stephen Sedley, "Defining Anti-Semitism," *London Review of Books*, vol. 39, no. 9 (2017); Brian Klug, "The Code of Conduct for Antisemitism: a tale of two texts," *Open Democracy UK*, 17/7/2018 accessed on 15/5/2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3MiEBhy>; Anthony Lerman, "Labour should ditch the IHRA working definition of antisemitism altogether," *Open Democracy UK*, 4/9/2018, accessed on 15/5/2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3yBJ0YK>

50 See, for example: Ian Lustick, "The Trump Administration Is Using Accusations of Anti-Semitism To Silence Criticism of Israel," *Forward*, 29/11/2019, accessed on 15/5/2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3NI21mF>

51 "The Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism," *Jerusalem Declaration*, 25/3/2021, accessed on 15/5/2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3yFq3ok>

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