Regime Elite Turnover in the Waning Syrian Civil War (2016-2021): A Socio-Economic Approach

المؤلفون

  • مؤلفون

  • Ammar Shamaileh
  • Alan Aloskan
  • Mohammed Zahr

الكلمات المفتاحية:

Elite Networks، Power Sharing، Syrian Civil War، Syrian Government

الملخص

This article presents an analysis of changes that occurred in the landscape of the political and economic elites during the Syrian Civil War and focuses in particular on transformations that ensued once the regime’s focus turned away from winning the war and toward consolidating power. It argues that weak leaders operating in networks where regime elites are fractured can find themselves in a state of “precarious stability”, where there is no need to immediately engage in power–sharing with elites but the potential for elite networks to evolve into a threat is high. In such cases, leaders are motivated by strategic incentives to make frequent changes to the elite landscape to prevent powerful networks from arising within the regime. This empirical analysis provides evidence that the Syrian regime’s efforts to maintain Assad’s rule have been characterised by drastic repeated changes to both who is favoured and the extent of their reach within Syria.

المراجع

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  24. It is, in our opinion, an area that has generally been neglected by scholars attempting to explore political change under Assad rule. As Figure (1) clearly demonstrates, significant changes in the patterns associated with survival rates indicate both that these cabinets are perceived as important by the leaders themselves and that leaders attempt to manipulate the composition of their cabinets to prevent threats. Source: Prepared by the authors.
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  27. Unsurprisingly, this brought back to the political stage the names of the old aristocratic families as mobilizers of political protest.
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  29. Although reports of the decline of Rami Makhlouf during the war appear to have been exaggerated, in relative terms, his power diminished throughout the war. Nevertheless, up until the regime’s actions against his interests, he remained powerful throughout the war.
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  33. There is significant heterogeneity in how individuals were recruited into such militias. Some volunteered, some transitioned from working leaders and financiers of militias to fighting in the militias, others were arrested by the government and given the option to be released if they agreed to fight in a militia. The exploration of such divergent paths into the militias is important to note, but a deeper exploration of this is beyond the scope of this article.
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  35. Ibid., pp. 171-172.
  36. Most notably, Maher Al-Assad’s fourth division developed strong ties with a diverse set of economic elites, many of whom were antagonistic toward one another. Ayman Aldassouky, “The Economic Networks of the Fourth Division During the Syrian Conflict,”Middle East Directions– Wartime and Post–Conflict in Syria, European University Institute (January 2020), accessed on 14/2/2022, at: https://bit.ly/3sEzQGn
  37. It is important to note that not all pro-regime militias operated under the banner of the NDF, but that an extensive discussion of these militias is beyond the scope of this article. Source: Prepared by the authors.
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  47. Liz Sly & Asser Khattab, “Syria’s Elections Have Always Been Fixed. This Time, Even Candidates Are Complaining,” Washington Post , 22/7/2022, accessed on 14/2/2022, at: https://wapo.st/3gKFaT8. Both Hamsho and Shehabi were surprisingly excluded from a second term in parliament during the 2020 elections.
  48. Mansour Hussein, “umarāʾ al-ḥarb yaksibūn maʿrakat ghuraf al-tijāra.. al-Assad yaqsī al-ḥaras al-qadīm,” Almudun , 8/10/2020, accessed on 14/2/2022, at: https://bit.ly/3gHG1Uy
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  50. “maṣnaʿ al-sukkar al-jadīd li-Samer Foz wa-shurakāʾ yaqlaʿ al-shahr al-qādim min ḥasyāʾ biṭāqat milyūn ṭin sanawiyyan,” Industry News , 8/3/2021, accessed on 14/2/2022, at: https://bit.ly/3uPdC7w; Although Foz has built the largest sugar refinery in Syria, it should be noted that on 27 July 2021, the government appears to have awarded a contract to refine sugar to other companies, and there is speculation one of the company awarded the contract is a front for the Qaterji brothers: “State Plants go to Influential Investors,” The Syria Report , 11/8/2021, accessed on 14/2/2022, at: https://bit.ly/3HQyXkw
  51. Qaterji may be a notable exception, as he has largely maintained both a significant coercive capacity and gained a seat in parliament, yet the Qaterji brothers and other warlords have also served as a threat to some urban elites.
  52. The list of individuals and families who may be considered among the elites is fairly long. The names highlighted above have been particularly notable, but others could also be incorporated.
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  54. He has been playing a progressively larger role in Syria’s economic arena, and, perhaps aside from possibly Ihab Makhlouf, has benefited most from the fall of Rami Makhlouf. Amin al-Assi, “al-Assad fī al-Qirdāḥa: taqsīm Al Makhlouf,” al-Arabi all-Jadid , 25/8/2020, accessed on 14/2/2022, at: https://bit.ly/3sIoUHK
  55. Such as the infamous Law no. 10 of 2018. See: Syrian Arab Republic, Syrian Prime Ministry, “Law no. 10 of 2018 which permits the creation of one or more organizational areas within the general organizational scheme of the administrative units by a decree based on the proposal of the Minister of Local Administration and Environment and the amendment of some articles of Legislative Decree No. 66 of 2012,”2/4/2018, accessed on 14/2/2022, at: https://bit.ly/3sFeitf
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Cover of العدد 11, Almuntaqa

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2022-05-01

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47 مشاهدة 57 تنزيل

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مجلد 5 عدد 011 (2022): العدد 11

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