Tribalism, Regionalism, and the Stalled Building of the Modern State in Libya

Authors

  • Author

  • Hani Mousa

Keywords:

Libya, State-Building, Tribalism, Regionalism, Governance, External Intervention

Abstract

This paper explores the underlying causes of the stalled state-building process in Libya, identifying tribalism and regionalism as the primary obstacles. It examines how different modes of governance and external interventions have aggravated and perpetuated the detrimental impacts of these obstacles, which have been intractable because state-building did not evolve organically over time. Instead, an externally imposed state model bypassed the transitional stages, preventing Libya from addressing its underlying tensions and contradictions. Consequently, Libya has remained mired in a cycle of self-serving, rival loyalty networks, creating an environment that hinders the formation of cohesive national identity – a prerequisite for a modern state.

References

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  33. In 1916, the Sanusi movement experienced a rift between a faction led by Ahmed Sharif al-Sanusi, which advocated armed resistance, and a faction led by Idris al-Sanusi, which supported a political accommodation with the colonial power. The dispute was ultimately resolved in favour of the latter.
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  86. Western powers sought to achieve other ends by intervening in Libya. They include countering Chinese penetration into Africa and Libya in particular. See: Muhammad Abdul Hafiz al-Mahdi, “Athar al-Tadakhul al-Khārijī ʿalā al-Thawra al-Lībiyya 2011,” Majallat Shuʾūn ʿArabiyya , no. 162 (Summer 2015), pp. 178-179.
  87. See: Jonathan M. Winer, “Origins of The Libyan Conflict and Options for Its Resolution,” Policy Paper , Middle East Institute (May 2019), p. 8, accessed on 7/11/2024, at: https://bit.ly/3HL8RAS
  88. See: Hajal, p. 136.
  89. For more on the concept and nature of the failed state, see: Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, World Peace Foundation, 2003), ch. 1, p. 5.
  90. Oil was discovered in Libya in the late 1950s, and production and export began in the early 1960s, transforming Libya virtually overnight from a poor to a rich country. Libya currently ranks fifth globally in subterranean oil reserves, accounting for 2% of the global output. It became a rentier state relying almost exclusively on oil revenues. However, successive governments did not take advantage of this boom to promote economic and political modernization or to build infrastructures to shorten the distances between the centre and the peripheries. Colonel Gaddafi had little interest in comprehensive development. To him, the vast oil revenues were a means to consolidate his grip on power, strengthen his alliances with certain factions, and buy tribal loyalties. See: Yusuf Muhammad Jumaa al-Sawani, “al-Wilāyāt al-Muttaḥida wa-Lībyā: Tanaquḍāt al-Tadakhkhul wa-Mustaqbal al- Kayān al-Lībī,” al-Mustaqbal al-ʿArabī , no. 431 (January 2015), pp. 9-11.
  91. The Amazigh made its mark early in the post-Gaddafi period with the establishment of the Libyan National Amazigh Congress in 2011. For more on Amazigh national demands, see: Abdullah, al- Ḥ irāk al-Amāzīghī wa-Dīnāmiyyāt al- Ḥ ayāt al-Siyāsiyya al-Lībiyya bayn Mumkināt al-Takayyuf wa-Azmat al-Indimāj al-Wa ṭ anī , pp. 46-49.
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