Regional Security Governance, Audience Expectations and Foreign Policy Roles: North Africa's Demand that Tunisia Maintains Its

Authors

  • Authors

  • Imad Mansour
  • John Daniels Hicks

Keywords:

Tunisian Foreign Policy, Strategic Distance, North African States, Role Theory

Abstract

This study explains change in Tunisian foreign policy in the decade following the 2010 revolts. It contributes to Role Theory by explaining how regional audience expectations are powerful determinants of foreign policy roles. First, the article demonstrates how regional states came to expect Tunisia to follow a specific foreign policy role. Second, it explains how these expectations conditioned role enactment. The article shows how Tunisia developed and established a foreign policy posture of strategic distance, defined by non-partisanship in regional conflicts, adherence to legalism, and pursuit of economic interest. Strategic distance came to be expected by North African states that in turn, pushed Tunisia to maintain it.

References

  1. We use North Africa following the African Union definition to mean the system composed of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, and the Western Sahara.
  2. Sebastian Harnisch, "Role Theory: Operationalization of Key Concepts," in: Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank & Hanns W. Maull (eds.), Role Theory in International Relations (London: Routledge, 2011); Cameron G. Thies, "State Socialization and Structural Realism," Security Studies, vol. 19, no. 4 (2010), pp. 689-717.
  3. In rational and cognitive designs, the modes of role change have often been distinguished by their causal origin: whether roles are "ascribed" by society or others or "achieved" by the beholder. Quoted in: Harnisch, Frank & Maull (eds.), p. 7.
  4. Nicole Grimaud, La Tunisie à la recherche de sa sécurité (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995); Youssef Cherif, "Tunisia's Foreign Policy: A Delicate Balance," Atlantic Council, 23 March 2015, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3GC1ZX1
  5. Sophie Bessis & Souhayr Belhassen, Bourguiba (Tunisia: Elyzad, 2012).
  6. Emma C. Murphy, "The Foreign Policy of Tunisia," in: Raymond Hinnebusch & Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds.), The Foreign Policies of Middle East States (Boulder: CO. Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 247.
  7. Hicham Bou Nassif, "Generals and Autocrats: How Coup-Proofing Predetermined the Military Elite's Behavior in the Arab Spring," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 130, no. 2 (2015), pp. 245 - 275.
  8. Sadri Khiari & Olfa Lamloum, "Le zaïm et l'artisan ou De Bourguiba à Ben Ali," Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, vol. 37 (1998), pp. 377 - 395.
  9. Michel Camau & Vincent Geisser (eds.), Habib Bourguiba: la trace et l'heritage (Paris: Karthala, 2004).
  10. Mohamed Ben Ahmed, Les Trois Décennies de Politique Etrangère du Président Bourguiba (Tunis: Centre de publication universitaire, 2019). We do not aim to explore the pre-independence period, but it is worth mentioning that Tunisia's armed forces have historically been weak in comparison with regional peers. For example, Algeria was always threatening Tunisia with invasion in the 19th century. Even in the early 20th century, an indicator of differences in capabilities was, for example, the means available to the Tunisian resistance compared to those that the Algerians used against France or the Libyans against Italy.
  11. Abdelaziz Chneguir, La politique etrangère de la Tunisie: 1956 - 19 87 (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2004).
  12. Irene Fernández-Molina, "Modelling for a Living: Two-level Games and Rhetorical Action in the Foreign Debt Negotiations of Post-revolutionary Tunisia," The Journal of North African Studies , vol. 24, no. 3 (2019), pp. 376-400; Michael Ayari, "Tunisie, 2011-2020: La démocratie contre l'efficience de l'action publique?," Politique Etrangère , no. 1 (2020), pp. 189-199, 234.
  13. Tom Long, "It's Not the Size, It's the Relationship: From 'Small States' to Asymmetry," International Politics, vol. 54, no. 2 (2017), pp. 144 - 160.
  14. Peter J. Schraeder et al., "Revolutionary Diplomats? Introduction to the Study of North African Foreign Policies Within the Context of the Arab Spring," The Journal of North African Studies, vol. 24, no. 4 (2019), pp. 540-557; Irene Fernández-Molina, Laura Feliu & Miguel Hernando de Larramendi, "The 'Subaltern' Foreign Policies of North African Countries: Old and New Responses to Economic Dependence, Regional Insecurity and Domestic Political Change," The Journal of North African Studies, vol. 24 no. 3 (2019), pp. 356 - 375.
  15. Imad Mansour, "Explaining the Influence of Maghrebi Rivalries on Tunisian Foreign Policy," The Journal of North African Studies, vol. 27, no. 2 (2022), pp. 394 - 422.
  16. Kalevi J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly , vol. 14, no. 3 (1970), pp.
  17. Cameron Thies & Marijke Breuning, "Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations Through Role Theory," Foreign Policy Analysis , vol. 8, no. 1 (2012), pp. 1 - 4.
  18. Marijke Breuning, "Role Theory Research in International Relations: State of the Art and Blind Spots," in: Harnisch, Frank & W. Maull (eds.).
  19. Cameron G. Thies, "International Socialization Processes vs. Israeli National Role Conceptions: Can Role Theory Integrate IR Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis?," Foreign Policy Analysis, vol. 8, no. 1 (2012), pp. 25 - 46.
  20. Cameron G. Thies, The United States, Israel, and the Search for International Order: Socializing States (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 33.
  21. Marijke Breuning, "Role Theory in Foreign Policy," Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics (2017); Jakob Gustavsson, "How Should we Study Foreign Policy Change?," Cooperation and Conflict , vol. 34, no. 1 (1999), pp. 73 - 95.
  22. Cameron G. Thies, "Sense and Sensibility in the Study of State Socialisation: A Reply to Kai Alderson," Review of International Studies, vol. 29 (2003), p. 548.
  23. Habib Bourguiba, "Nationalism: Antidote to Communism," Foreign Affairs, vol. 35, no. 4 (1957), pp. 646 - 654.
  24. Leslie E. Wehner & Cameron Thies, "Leader Influence in Role Selection Choices: Fulfilling Role Theory's Potential for Foreign Policy Analysis," International Studies Review , vol. 23, no. 4 (2021); Cameron Thies & Marijke Breuning, "Integrating Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations Through Role Theory," Foreign Policy Analysis , vol. 8, no. 1 (2012), pp. 1 - 4.
  25. Imad Mansour, "Explaining the Influence of Maghrebi Rivalries," in: Thies, The United States, Israel , pp. 32-41; Breuning, "Role Theory Research in International Relations," pp. 23 - 26.
  26. Hakmi Bou Hafs, "al-Iṣlāhāt wa-l-Numuw al-Iqtiṣādī fī Shamāl Afrīqiyā," Majallat Iqtisadiyyat Shamal Afriqia - Journal of North African Economies, no. 7 (2009), p. 16.
  27. Alistair R. Anderson, Sana El Harbi & Meriem Brahem, "TheTunisian textile industry: local responses to internationalization," European Journal of International Management, vol. 6, no. 5 (2012), pp. 525 - 541.
  28. Rosita Di Peri, "An Enduring 'Touristic Miracle' in Tunisia?," British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 42, no. 1 (2015), pp. 104 - 118.
  29. At certain moments, Tunisia can be thought of as having been in a rivalry with Libya; however, it was not unlike other regional states, given Libya's highly provocative behaviors. See: Yahia H. Zoubir & Louisa Dris-Aït-Hamadouche, Global Security Watch: The Maghreb: Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia (California: Praeger, 2013).
  30. See the rich memoir of Tahar Belkhodja: Tahar Belkhodja, Les trois décénnies Bourguiba, 3rd ed. (‎Paris: Arcantères Publisud, 2010).
  31. The Gafsa military operation was orchestrated by Libya's Qaddafi in retaliation to the Tunisia's Bourguiba freezing the Treaty of Djerba pending a popular referendum (which never happened). A referendum was never conducted. Arguably, the plan was for Libyan-supported forces from Tunisia to create a state of unrest and instability inside Tunisia, thereby opening the door for broader external intervention. Algeria is often noted to have a role in the operation, especially by facilitating the movement across its territories of the Libyan-supported Tunisian forces. However, there are doubts that the Algerian president approved this facilitation, with some sources citing "non-conformist" Algerian generals as implicated. See: "Rashīd Khashāna: Arbaʿūn ʿĀman ʿAlā ʿAmaliyyat Gafṣa al-Latī Aḍāʿat ʿAlaynā Furaṣan Kubrā," Leaders , 24/4/2020, accessed on 2/7/2023, at: https://bit. ly/46Ixvxw
  32. Mohamed A. El-Khawas, "Revolutionary Islam in North Africa: Challenges and Responses," Africa Today, vol. 43, no. 4 (1996), pp. 385 - 404.
  33. Hédi Baccouche, En toute franchise (Tunis: Sud Editions, 2018).
  34. For example, Tunisia's commitment to bind itself to legal arbitration emerging from international institutions (e.g., regarding labor regulations) was partly designed to achieve its economic goals noted above. See: Michael J. Willis, Politics and Power in the Maghreb (London: Hurst, 2012).
  35. International Court of Justice, "Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)," 1982, accessed on 5/2/2022, at: https://bit.ly/3JDM2S1
  36. For statement by Tunisia on the ruling, see: Cour Internationale De Justice , Recueil des arrêts, avis consultatifs et ordonnances , Affaire du Plateau continental (Tunisie/ Jamahiriya arabe libyenn) , Arrêt du 24 fevrier 1982, accessed on 4/2/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3JGsdtl, (especially p. 39 which shows Tunisia requesting that the IJC determines enforcement procedures). See also: Cour Internationale De Justice, Correspondance , "Réponse aux questions' de S. Exc. M. de Lacharrière, Vice-F'résident de la Cour internationale de Justice (1985)," accessed on 4/2/2023, at: https:// bit.ly/3HCQJcd (especially p. 290 which shows continued commitment to ICJ arbitration in correspondence by Tunisian government representative).
  37. Mansour, "Explaining the Influence of Maghrebi Rivalries."
  38. Preamble to the 2014 Tunisian Constitution, see: "Constitution de La République Tunisienne," Tunis le 26 Janvier 2014, Al bawsala, accessed on 2/4/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3XqtyrI
  39. Preamble to the 1959 Tunisian Constitution, see: "Tunisia Tn 028: La Constitution de La République Tunisienne, 1959," WIPO IP Portal, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3vO7Ku8
  40. Yadh Ben Achour, Une Révolution en Pays d'Islam (Genève: Labor et Fides, 2018).
  41. Preamble to the 1963 Algerian Constitution, see: "Constitution de la Republique Algerienne Democratique et Populaire," Journal Officiel De La Republique Algerienne (10 Septembre 1963), accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3IuHP2s. For Egypt, see article five of the 1971 Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt: "Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt 1971," International Labour Organization, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3VRCwwQ
  42. See the 1962 Moroccan Constitution: "MAROC: Constitution du 7 décembre 1962," Digithèque MJP , accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3VToqLz
  43. On the favorable outcome of Ghannouchi's (as leader of Ennahda) visit to China to meet with the foreign minister on 18 September 2014, see: "Ghannouchi: Ce qui m'a impressionné en Chine," Leaders , 10/10/2014, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3X7VuAu. For an Algerian delegation visit and amicable bilateral talks in China from 28 April through 1 May 2015, see: "Visite de Sellal en Chine: Plusieurs accords de partenariat et contrats conclus," Algeria-watch , 13/12/2009, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3VRE6yM. For the visit by Mohammed VI to China in 10 May 2016, see: "Visite officielle de SM le Roi en République populaire de Chine," Royaume du Maroc, Maroc.ma , 10/5/2016, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3jUqA08. For the official visit of President Xi to Cairo on 20 January 2016, see: Lin Noueihed & Ali Abdelaty, "China's Xi visits Egypt, offers financial, political support," Reuters , 21/1/2016, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://reut.rs/3jUpilN. Finally, on the Morocco-China talks (22 October 2020) that did not contain any acknowledgment of the Uighur issue, see: Royaume du Maroc, Ministère des affaires étrangères de la coopération africaine et des marocains résidant à l'étranger, "M. Bourita s'entretient avec le ministre d'etat et ministre des affaires étrangères de la république populaire de Chine, M. Wang Yi," 22/10/2020, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3VNx9Pj
  44. Tunisia Parliament Approves Unity Government," Aljazeera , 6/2/2015, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3ii58lg
  45. Giulia Cimini, "The Economic Agendas of Islamic Parties in Tunisia and Morocco: Between Discourses and Practices," Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, vol. 11, no. 3 (2017), p. 50.
  46. Aisha Abbas, Jadaliyyat al-Sulṭa wa-l-Muʿāraḍa al-Siyāsiyya fī Tūnis: Dirāsa Taḥlīliyya fī ʿIlāqāt al-Ṣirāʿ wa-l-Tafāʿul wa-l-Iḥtiwāʾ (Jordan: Dar al-Khaleej lil-Nashr wa-l-Tawzeeʿ, 2020). In this first free election, the Islamist Ennahda won more than 41% of the vote, securing 90 seats of the 217 Constituent Assembly. See: "Tunisia's Islamist Ennahda Party Wins Historic Poll," BBC NEWS , 27/10/2011, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bbc.in/3ZjYjjK
  47. Marc Lynch, "Rached Ghannouchi: The FP Interview," Foreign Policy (December 5, 2012), accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3CtTaM9
  48. Perhaps the most prominent other example is Putin's position in the Russian state in-between his presidencies.
  49. Konrad Pedziwiatr & Rachela Tonta,"Turbulent Muslim Renaissance in Tunisia: Interview with Ennahda's Yusra Ghannouchi," Jadaliyya (June 4, 2014). See also interview with President Marzouki: "Exclusive Interview: Tunisian President Marzouki," Al-Monitor , 22/9/2012, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3QjjQoA
  50. David Hearst, "Muslim Brotherhood Urged to Share Power in Egypt," The Guardian , 12/6/2012, accessed on 10/1/2023, at:
  51. See, for example: "Tunisie-Ennahdha Organise Une Deuxième Manifestation de Soutien à Mohamed Morsi," Business News , 10/7/2013, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3GnTux7
  52. Isabelle Mandraud, "'Kadhafi est Toujours là' Pour les Libyens de Tunis," Le Monde , 13/5/2014, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit. ly/3WSGt5I
  53. On the turbulent domestic Libyan process post-Qaddafi, see: Nathalie Guibert, Yves-Michel Riols & Hélène Sallon, "Libya's Tripoli and Tobruk dilemma no nearer to resolution," The Guardian, 27/1/2015, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3GtMj6W. On Tunisia's stance on Libyan politics, see: "Tunisia Demands Fair Trial Guarantees for Libya's ex-PM," France 24 , 2/1/2012, https://bit.ly/3VKRzZm
  54. Abdelaziz Bouteflika welcomed Ghannouchi on 13 March 2016: "Rached Ghannouchi reçu par le président algérien Abdelaziz Bouteflika," Realties , 14/3/2016, accessed on 9/5/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3VHeSox. Moreover, after cultivating favorable relations with now-President Tebboune under the Bouteflika government, reference was made to Ghannouchi supporting an alliance with Algeria during a 23 February 2021 Diwan FM radio interview. See: "Tunisie: Rached Ghannouchi tente-t-il de se rapprocher de l'Algérie?" Jeune Afrique , 8/3/2021, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3VTCkxf
  55. On Tunisian support for resistance groups in Syria, see: "Tunisia Gives 'Moral' Support to Syria Rebels: Ennahda," Morocco World News , 13/3/2013, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3CvdjSh
  56. On Tunisia's diplomatic position regarding Syria, see: Tarek Amara, "Tunisia 'to Withdraw' Recognition of Syria Government," Reuters , 4/2/2012, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://reut.rs/3Izs7Dj
  57. See a speech by president Marzouki at the United Nations on 25 September 2014: "A Speech by Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki in the General Assembly," United Nations, United Nations News, 25/9/2014, accessed on 5/2/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3X6a1fH
  58. In 2015-19, internal struggles involved Caid Essebsi (Nidaa Tunis with him) moving with and against the establishment vs. Ennahda vs. public opinion. By 2019-22, it was Kais Saied vs. Ennahda vs. the establishment, which was looking negatively toward his presidential power centralization.
  59. Tunisian foreign minister negatively evaluated Egypt's ability to realize its own proposal to establish an Arab anti-terrorism task force. See "Egypt Proposal for Arab Force 'Unrealistic': Tunisia," Middle East Monitor , 12/3/2015, https://bit.ly/3VTFvFb
  60. Thies, "State Socialization and Structural Realism."
  61. Harnisch, "Role Theory: Operationalization of Key Concepts,"11-12.
  62. Most notable of these opponents is the GSPC (the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) which was the precursor of AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) itself neutralized as a viable threat by internal dysfunction. On amnesty, see: "La charte pour la paix et la réconciliation nationale," Republique Algerienne Démocratique Et Populaire , 23/11/2015, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3GIPWqS; On cooperation, see: "La plate-forme de Rome in 1995," Le monde diplomatique , Mars 1995, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3ZfHxlV. See also: José Garçon, "L'armée du FIS appelle au cessez-le-feu en Algerie. Un succès des militaires, qui ne garantit pas la fin des violences," Libération , 25/9/1997, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3vOt1E0
  63. See a 2011 report by Le Monde on the state of emergency in Algeria: "Algérie: L'état d'urgence levé en Algérie," Le Monde , 24/2/2011, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3VWzHdT. See a 2011 report by Al Jazeera on protests on a backdrop of increasing unemployment and rising costs of living: "Price Protests Erupt Across Algeria," Aljazeera , 7/1/2011, accessed on 10/1/2023 at: https://bit.ly/3ZgpuvS. See a report on Algerian opposition announcing public demonstrations in February 2011: "L'opposition algérienne annonce une nouvelle marche le 19 février," Libération , 13/2/2011, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3WVkBqG
  64. Morocco has the Western Sahara issue, which Rabat considers as an integral part of its territory, and which sparks fears of territorial division.
  65. The 2011 Moroccan Constitution included key provisions transferring authority from the monarch to parliament and expanding liberal protections. See the Constitution at: Royaume du Maroc, Secretariat General du Gouvernement, La Constitution: Edition 2011 , Serie Documentation Juridique Marocaine, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3Cs3V1u
  66. Karine Bennafla & Haounès Seniguer, "Le Maroc à l'épreuve du printemps arabe: Une contestation désamorcée," Outre-Terre , no. 29 (2011), pp. 153 - 155. See also the Morocco government portal for a text of the King's address (19 March 2013): "Texte intégral du discours adressé par SM le Roi à la Nation," Royaume du Maroc, Maroc.ma , 9/3/2011, accessed on 2/4/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3CMa8pb. Moreover, we read an emphasis on the "territorial integrity" of Morocco when king Mohammed VI announced a reform agenda, indicating a rhetorical shift accompanying the return of Algeria as a politicised threat away from "now placated" internal opposition. It should be noted that in the above Algeria is not expressly mentioned by Moroccan leadership. Whereas other sources show the shifting security status following the 2011 protests which created conditions conducive to renew the Morocco-Algeria rivalry; see: Rasmus Alenius Boserup, Luis Martinez & Ulla Holm, "Algeria after the Revolts: Regime Endurance in a Time of Contention and Regional Insecurity," Danish Institute for International Studies Report, no. 15 (2014), accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3Ivf0D2
  67. Ryad Hamadi, "Normalisation avec Israël: Le Maroc répond à l'Algérie," TSA , 20/12/2020, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3CtTJFV
  68. Algerian politicians continue to invoke Morocco's more peaceful transition to independence to vilify France's regional politics. Targeting France's colonizing past in public discourse is undivorceable from its association with Morocco, and an indirect means of furthering a wedge between Algeria and Morocco. See: Ryad Hamadi, "Djaaboub traite la France d''ennemi traditionnel et éternel' de l'Algérie," TSA , 8/4/2021, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3jYpSPj
  69. The launch – ostensibly aimed at furthering state ability to combat ISIL and other militants – drew Algerian criticism, deepened by French contribution to the project. See: "Morocco's Secret Launch Of A Powerful Observation Satellite Puts Neighbouring Countries On Alert," France 24 , 21/11/2017, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3CwT3Qe
  70. On the "wall" see: Safaa Kasraoui, "Algeria Launches Construction of 'High-Tech' Border Wall at Moroccan Border," Morocco World News , 31/10/2017, accessed on 4/2/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3Wb1yrd. See also: "L'algérie accuse le Maroc d'entretenir 'le trafic des armes' aux frontières," Le desk , 12/4/2021, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3k1dluQ
  71. For an encompassing analysis of the rivalry, see: Yahia H. Zoubir,"The Algerian-Moroccan Rivalry: Constructing the Imagined Enemy," in: Imad Mansour & William R. Thompson (eds.), Shocks and Rivalries in the Middle East and North Africa (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2020).
  72. Sarah Alaoui, "Morocco, commander of the (African) faithful?," Brookings, 8/4/2019, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://brook.gs/2WU65zP
  73. Ahmad Weld Yahia, "The Soufi Tariqas: A New Confrontation in the Morocco-Algeria Struggle," Bawabat al-Awsat , 15/5/2014, accessed on 1/2/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3WQ4Cd7
  74. Karim Msawleh, al-Amn fī Manṭiqat al-Sāḥil wa-l Ṣaḥrāʾ fī Afrīqiyā (Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2014), pp. 92 - 94.
  75. Initially, the 2013 deposal of the Morsi-led MB government spurred a significant change in Egypt's regional posturing, as surrounding states criticized the newly-installed el-Sisi government as antithetical to self-determination and democracy. Egypt's reputational issues hampered their participation in international initiatives, when banned from the African Union and excluded from regional talks; this led to the imposing of sanctions by the Peace and Security Council (AU PSC Communiqué, 2013). See the Communiqué at: "Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 384th Meeting on the Situation in the Arab Republic of Egypt," African Union, 9/7/2013, accessed on 10/1/2023 at: https://bit.ly/3jUWSIn
  76. Egypt announced on 24 July 2014 that it has no plans for military intervention in Libya, see: "No plan for military intervention in Libya: Egypt FM," Ahram Online , 5/8/2014, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3GNZ91d. However, Egypt called for humanitarian-driven international intervention in Libya, see: "Egypt Calls for foreign Intervention in Libya," Aljazeera , 17/2/2015, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3ZmK4L1
  77. Yasser Elnaggar, "Egypt and the African Union," MEI@75 , 10/2/2020, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3Cr7wgf. Moreover, riding on regional instability to rebuild Egypt's international standing opened additional pathways for internal development and capacity-building, such as its successful negotiation of IMF loans; opportunities that may have otherwise been unavailable had Egypt not been recast as a check on militancy in North Africa. See: "IMF Executive Board Approves US$12 Billion Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility for Egypt," Press Release , no. 16/501, International Monetary Fund, 11/11/2016, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/2IewqS5
  78. Lamine Chikhi & Maggie Fick, "Algeria, Egypt's Sisi Talk Security, Gas Shipments," Reuters , 26/6/2014, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://reut.rs/3WTbFSy
  79. Anna Knoll & Chloe Teevan, "Protecting Migrants and Refugees in North Africa: Challenges and Opportunities for Reform," Discussion Paper , no. 281 (Maastricht: The European Centre for Development Policy Management, 2020).
  80. Alaa Elhadidi, "Egypt's Shifting Foreign Policy Priorities: How are Abdel Fattah El-Sisi's Foreign Policy Priorities Expected to ,?" The Cairo Review of Global Affairs (2018).
  81. Four-finger Salutes as Turks back Egypt Protesters," Reuters , 19/8/2013, accessed on 10/1/2023, at https://reut.rs/3WUcA5g. As the 2020s has been proving, however, positions can change because the ideology behind them is weak, and physical security threats have taken precedence.
  82. For the perspective of Cairo, see: Deya Abaza, "Egypt Will not Renew Transit-trade Agreement with Turkey: Officials," Ahram Online , 27/10/2014, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3XfYj2i. In turn, Turkey, in rebuffing Egyptian rhetorical attacks including accusations of instigating conflict in Libya, counters Egypt's with argument about "it is not surprising that those who have taken over their administration by coup d'état support a putschist [Haftar]" and highlights its dedicated role in combating the Islamic State forces in Syria, such as in "hand-to-hand combat". See: "Statement of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hami Aksoy, in Response to a Question Regarding the Statement of the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt on the Accusations of Egyptian Foreign," Latest Press Releases , QA-44, Republic of Türkiye, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 June 2020, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3ihiQFd
  83. For the Egyptian statement condemning Tunisia's "intervention", see: Rana Muhammad Taha, "Egypt Condemns Tunisia's UNGA Address," Daily News Egypt , 27/9/2013, accessed on 10/1/2023, at:Rana Muhammad Taha, "Egypt's Ambassador in Tunis Returns to Egypt," Daily News Egypt , 30/9/2013, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3irRHiF
  84. Abou Essaoud Lahmidi, "Rached Ghannouchi déclare la guerre à l'Algérie!" African Manager , 2/8/2013, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3QqDU8D
  85. See the Moroccan King's speech at Kingdom of Morocco, "Full Text Of The Throne Day Speech Delivered By HM King Mohammed VI," Maroc.ma , Royal Speeches, 30/7/2014, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3CSZZr9
  86. Peter Cole, Borderline Chaos? Stabilizing Libya's Periphery (Washington, DC.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012).
  87. See President Marzouki's supervision during the Supreme Security Council meeting in the Carthage Palace: "Lutfi bin Jiddo: Supreme Security Council Meeting Discussed the Clashes in Libya and its Impact on Tunisia," babnet , 16/5/2014, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3GpFCCy; See an interview with President Marzouki: "Exclusive Interview: Tunisian President Marzouki."
  88. Porter (2015, 51-55) argues that Algeria initially opposed other states' Libya intervention; however, and despite its anti-interventionist posture, Algeria accepted Egypt's strikes, prioritizing security. Geoff D. Porter, "Le non-interventionnisme de l'Algérie en question," Politique étrangère , no. 3 (2015), pp. 43 - 55.
  89. Yahia H. Zoubir, "Security Challenges in the Maghreb: The Nexus between Bad Governance and Violent Extremism," EuroMeSCo Brief , no. 70 (2017).
  90. Meetings between Algeria and Tunisia aimed at creating joint task forces to share intelligence related to movement of people and goods. See: Ibrahim Menshawi, "cautious direction: The Algerian Position Toward the Evolution of Events in Tunisia," Arab Center for Research and Studies, 8/4/2015, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3ikhWHM
  91. Ahmad Weld Yahia, "'ghost hunting' is a Maghrebi regional plan to track 'ISIS' members," Bawabat al-Awsat 27/8/2014, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3CvCd3X. In addition to coordinating with Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco were also resistant to Tunisian calls to resurrect the Arab Maghreb Union. See: Julien Peyron, "La Tunisie s'engage seule dans la relance de l'Union du Maghreb," France 24 , 4/7/2012, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3GrkOus
  92. Hamza Meddeb, The Volatile Tunisia-Libya Border: Between Tunisia's Security Policy and Libya's Militia Factions (Beirut: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020), pp. 3-4, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3jYqG74
  93. Tunisia Arrests Libyan 'Terrorist' with Explosives," Reuters , 9/5/2013, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://reut.rs/3jWcQ51. On attacks and their effects, see: Benoît Delmas, "Ben Guerdane: L'attaque terroriste la plus grave subie par la Tunisie," Le Point Afrique (2016).
  94. On the Tunisian-Algerian bilateral dimension, see: "Algérie: Abdelmalek Sellal reçoit Adnane Manser," Business News , 10/1/2014, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3ZaTxVI; on the Tunisia-Morocco bilateral dimension, see the 2014 Tunisia-Morocco cooperation decree: "Décret n° 2014 - 3644 du 3 octobre 2014, portant ratification de l'accord de coopération dans le domaine de l'environnement entre le gouvernement de la République Tunisienne et le gouvernement du Royaume du Maroc," Journal Officiel de la République Tunisienne , no. 84, 17/10/2014, p. 2734.
  95. Khadija Mohsen-Finan, "Tunisia: The Running Battle Between the Government and the UGTT," OrientXXI , 30/3/2017, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3vHMoyO
  96. Messages by Tunisia to clarify its foreign policy change persisted. For example, in reaction to the Mali military flare-up and the hostage-taking in an oil refinery in Algeria in 2013, the Tunisian president called upon regional countries to "unify efforts and security policies" to fend off violence and terrorism. See: "Tunisian Government expresses concern toward 'security reflections from the situation in Mali," Akhbar Muritania , accessed on 10/1/2023, at: http://goo.gl/CgjPRL. See also news report on the Tunisian-Algerian security collaboration: "Tunisia officially asks for Algeria's 'rescue' and will send a security and political delegation headed by the foreign minister tomorrow," Dunya al-Watan , 5/8/2013, accessed on 1/10/2923, at: http://goo.gl/yQT3fI. An example is the Algeria-Tunisia security cooperation in the bordering Chaambi Mountains to combat AQIM.
  97. On Egypt's stance from Libya, see: Walid al-Talili, "Tunisia in Libya: the non-stance policy to avoid external outrade," Al-Arabi al-Jadid , 13/5/2022, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3IxTZaF. On the Egypt-Tunisia position over Libya, see: "The Egyptian Initiative to solve the Libyan crisis," State Information Service , 16/6/2022, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3Gt3PYI
  98. On Tunisia's coordination with Algeria and Morocco over antiterrorism campaigns, see: "La Tunisie veut renforcer sa coopération antiterroriste avec l'Algérie et le Maroc," France 24 , 11/5/2016, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3ZjsHuy
  99. See the statement of the Tunisian Foreign Affairs Minister at: "Khémaies Jhinaoui: La Tunisie sera la voix du monde arabe et de l'Afrique à l'ONU," La Presse.tn , 10/10/2019, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3ihNaQ1
  100. Yuksel Serdar Oguz, "Q&A with Secretary-general of Tunisia's Ennahda," Anadolu Agency, October 20, 2015, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3VVogmZ
  101. See the Tunisian Prime Minister's statement: "Normalisation with Israel 'not on Agenda', Says Tunisian PM," Aljazeera, 15/12/2020, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3VSQzlV
  102. For example, Tunisia's tepid response to the Khashoggi assassination prioritized regional appeasement. See: Fayçal Métaoui, "Mohammed ben Salmane est plus ou moins le bienvenu au Maghreb," Presse - toi à gauche! 4/12/2018, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3iqGRtl
  103. Silvia Colombo & Benedetta Voltolini, "The EU's Engagement with 'Moderate' Political Islam: The Case of Ennahda," LSE Middle East Centre Papers Series , no. 19 (London: LSE Middle East Centre, 2017), pp. 11-13, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3GM6myK
  104. For Tunisia's position on Syria, see: "Tunisia calls for Arab League to readmit Syria," Aljazeera , 26/1/2019, accessed on 4/2/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3IxPMUj
  105. On Tunisia mending ties, see: Yosra Ouanes & Gulsen Topcu, "Tunisia Bids to Mend Ties with Algeria," Andalou Agency , 16/12/2020, accessed on 4/2/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3QqD1gl
  106. See the speech of the 2013 Tunisian President to the EU Parliament: "Moncef Marzouki, Président de la République tunisienne," Europarl , accessed on 1/10/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3ZmILM2
  107. See the speech of Rached Ghannouchi at a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace event in Washington D.C. on 26 February 2014: "Rached Ghannouchi on Tunisia's Democratic Transition," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 2014, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3ioUU2s
  108. Frédéric Bobin, "En Tunisie, 'le parti Nidaa Tounès est devenu une coquille vide'," Le Monde , 16/3/2016, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3IzL3lc
  109. The March 2015 Bardo National Museum attacks in Tunis and the June 2015 attack on a hotel in Port El Kantaoui exposed the severity of threats posed by porous borders and the country's reliance on the security and intelligence apparatuses of neighboring states. These incidents confirmed that Tunisia's national interest is served by meeting regional expectations, especially when its economic performance is dependent on these regional states' security support. See: Abdennour Benantar, "Algeria's Security Policy: Transformations and Dilemmas in the Context of Regional Unrest and Internal Ḥirāk," AlMuntaqa , vol. 5, no. 2 (September 2022), p. 77.
  110. Tunisia's Ennahda Distances Itself from Political Islam," Aljazeera , 21/5/2016, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3ilxVp4
  111. Attacks inside Tunisia highlighted the need for intra-regional security cooperation, as well as cooperation across the MENA and the Sahel; regional conflicts and rivalries especially between Algeria and Morocco impede the construction of robust security institutions. See: Samia Errazzouki, "Lost in the Debate: Beyond Dominant Narratives on the Western Sahara," Jadaliyya , 3/6/2013, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3GYiDAl.
  112. For the Algerian position, see for example: "Depuis Tunis, Abdelmalek Sellal déclare: La situation dans la région impose davantage de coordination," Radio Algérienne , 9/3/2017, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3WT8iuF
  113. See for example a report by Radio France Internationale: "Les propos d'un responsable marocain sur la Kabylie fâchent l'Algérie," RFI , 19/7/2021, accessed on 10/1/2023 at: https://bit.ly/3ZmoExO
  114. Mohammed Fawzi, Aggravated Crises: Dimensions of the Wave of Resignations inside Tunisia's Ennahda , Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 29/9/2021, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3VVYezK
  115. Nizar Bou-Lihya, "The Tunisia Crisis: What Implications on Maghrebi States?" Al-Quds Al-Arabi , 2/2/2021, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3VP2xgo
  116. The visit was on 27 July 2021. See: Hadeel Hilal, "Moroccan Foreign Minister Hands a Letter from the King to the Tunisian President," al-Shurouq , 27/7/2021, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3GOsF6G
  117. See the Egyptian foreign ministry statement on 1 August 2021: Samar Nasr, "Foreign Ministry: Egypt trusts the wisdom and ability of the Tunisian Presidency to overcome this crisis," Bawwabat al-Ahram , 1/8/2021, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://bit.ly/3XgThTg
  118. Tunisian predictability becomes more necessary given Turkey's regional interventions. Heba Saleh, "Egypt Threatens Military Action in Libya if Turkish-Backed Forces Seize Sirte," Financial Times , 21/6/2020, accessed on 10/1/2023, at: https://on.ft.com/3WT4vhh
  119. Wehner & Thies, "Leader Influence in Role Selection Choices."
Cover of العدد 13, Almuntaqa

Downloads

PDF (Hosted)
HTML

Published

2023-01-01

Usage statistics

48 views 69 downloads

Issue

Vol. 6 No. 013 (2023): Issue 013

Section

المقالات

License

Copyright (c) 2023 Almuntaqa

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.