The Illusion of the Tunisian Exception: Civil Society and Democratic Transition

Authors

  • Author

  • Mehdi Mabrouk

Keywords:

Tunisia, Democratic Transition, Exceptionalism, Civil Society

Abstract

Tunisia’s democratic transition has attracted considerable scholarly attention, and is often portrayed as a notable exception. However, the reversal of most democratic gains in the decade following the 2011 revolution has called this narrative into question. This study deconstructs the notion of Tunisian exceptionalism through a critical examination of civil society, tracing its role from the pre-revolutionary period through the democratic transition, and up to Kais Saied’s 2021 coup. The study shows that Tunisian civil society contributed to the derailment of the democratic transition in three ways: first, by exacerbating Islamist-secular polarization, resulting in a fragmented “two-headed” civil society; second, by becoming an extension of political parties; and third, by encroaching on the role of the state, undermining its legitimacy and effectiveness in the public sphere.

References

  1. Scholars disagree over how to label this event. Some refer to it simply as a coup, while others insist it is more precisely a constitutional coup. In my opinion, the discussion extends beyond the legal and constitutional foundations of President Kais Saied’s actions. Beginning on 25 July, he instituted a series of measures that enabled him to abolish the 2014 constitution, dissolve the government, dismantle the Supreme Judicial Council, and suspend most of the independent constitutional bodies. He further monopolized power, dismantled the institutions of the democratic transition, and began formulating a political system based on a “grassroots structure” and the exclusion of mediating bodies, parties, organizations, and associations. All of this took place amid an authoritarian populist discourse that derailed the country’s democratic transition, however flawed.
  2. In the first six months of 2013, Tunisia experienced shortages of several staple foodstuffs, including bread, milk, sugar, and tea. Prices rose to unprecedented levels, and hundreds of vital medicines became unavailable. Despite this, virtually all demonstrations came to a halt.
  3. “La croissance économique au quatrième trimestre 2023,” Statisques Tunisie , accessed on 26/8/2024, at: https://tinyurl.com/y457jtyk
  4. Was the democratic transition democratizing? What was the place of democracy in it? Answers to these questions have varied, particularly that some observers believe that democratic values and culture were atrophied, which led political initiatives to prioritize governance and gain power at the expense of consolidating democracy in educational curricula, culture, and institutions. Two important sources enrich a consideration of this question, each taking a different perspective and treating a different time. See: Vincent Geisser & Amin Allal, Tunisie, Une démocratisation au–dessus de tout soupçon (Paris: CNRS éditions, 2018); Ghassane Salame, Démocraties sans démocrates: Politiques d’ouverture dans le monde arabe et islamique (Paris: Fayard, 1994), pp. 142-143.
  5. See: Charles Tilly, The Contentious French (London: Harvard University Press, 1986); Michel Camau, L’exception Tunisienne: Variation sur un mythe (Paris: IRMC, Karthala, 2018).
  6. See: Michel Camau & Vincent Geisser, Le syndrome autoritaire: Politique en Tunisie de Bourguiba à Ben Ali (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2003).
  7. See: Alexis de Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérique, souvenirs: L'ancien régime et la révolution (Paris: éd. Robert Laffont/Bouquins, 1986).
  8. Michel Camau, “Globalisation démocratique et exception autoritaire arabe,” Critique internationale , vol. 1, no. 30 (2006), pp. 59-81; Nicolas Guilhot & Philippe C. Schmitter, “De la transition à la consolidation: Une lecture rétrospective des democratization studies,” Revue française de science politique , vol. 50, no. 4-5 (2000), pp. 615-632; Diane Ethier, “L’imposition de la démocratie a-t-elle été l’exception ou la règle depuis 1945?,” Études internationales , vol. 41, no. 3 (2000), pp. 313-339; Alfred Stepan & Graeme Robertson, “An Arab More Than a Muslim Electoral Gap,” Journal of Democracy , vol. 14, no. 3 (2003), pp. 30-59; Sanford Lakoff, “The Reality of Muslim Exceptionalism,” Journal of Democracy , vol. 15, no. 4 (2004), pp. 133-139; John Waterbury, “Democracy Without Democrats? The Potential for Political Liberalization in the Middle East,” in: Ghassan Salame (ed.), Democracy without Democrats: The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994), pp. 23-47.
  9. Yadh Ben Achour has examined some aspects of this exception; see: Yadh Ben Achour, Tunis: Thawra fī Bilād al-Islām (Tunis: Dar Saras, 2017).
  10. Mohamed Nachi, Socio-anthropologie des cultures arabo-islamiques, sociologie de la “révolution” tunisienne. L'exception tunisienne: Vers un “compromis historique?” (Liège: Presse universitaires de liège, 2015).
  11. Other aspects of Tunisian exceptionalism have been explored in the writings of some Tunisian sociologists who theorize a Tunisian character with a set of specific traits. For Mahmud al-Dhawadi, for example, this character is “combative” and “unreconciled with its language” and religious symbols, while for Moncef Wanas, it is conciliatory and easily appeased. For both, this personality is distinct from that of other Arabs, based on the idea of a “base personality”. This articulation of exceptionalism takes on a socio-anthropological dimension that is not subject to historical periodization or chronology and is quasi-essentialist. See: Moncef Wanas, al-Shakhṣiyya al-Tūnisiyya: Muḥāwala fī Fahm al-Shakhṣiyya al-‘Arabiyya (Tunis: al-Dar al-Mutawassita, 2010); Mahmud al-Dhawadi, al-Mujtamaʿ al-Tūnisī wa-Iḥtiḍānuhū li-Maʾziq al-Istilāb: Iʿāqat al-Lugha wa-Irtibāk al-Huwiyya (Tunis: Mujamaʿ al-Atrash, 2019), p. 231.
  12. Nicolas Beau & Dominique Lagarde, L’exception tunisienne. Chronique d’une transition démocratique mouvementée (Paris: Seuil, 2014), p. 197.
  13. Mahmoud Ben Romdhane, “Développement et démocratie: L’exception tunisienne,” L'année du Maghreb , no. 3 (2007), pp. 427-455.
  14. Camau, “Globalisation démocratique et exception autoritaire arabe,” p. 59.
  15. Ivan Ermakoff, “Epistemologie de l'exception,” Sociétés plurielles, no. 1 (2017).
  16. Azmi Bishara, al-Intiqāl al-Dīmuqrāṭī: Dirāsa Naẓariyya wa-Taṭbīqiyya Muqārina [Democratic Transition: A Comparative Theoretical and Applied Study] (Doha/Beirut: ACRPS, 2020), pp. 229-259.
  17. Choukri Hmed, “Au-delà de l’exception tunisienne: Les failles et les risques du processus révolutionnaire,” Pouvoirs , vol. 156 (2016), pp. 137-147.
  18. Camau, L’exception tunisienne , pp. 14-16.
  19. Hammadi Redessi (ed.), La transition bloquée (Tunis: Diwen Edition, 2021).
  20. Rafaâ Ben Achour & Sana Ben Achour, “La transition démocratique en Tunisie: Entre légalité constitutionnelle et légitimité révolutionnaire,” Revue française de droit constitutionnel , vol. 4, no. 92 (2012), pp. 715-732.
  21. Mohamed Zied Chamsi, “Consensus et démocratie en Tunisie,” PhD dissertation in law, jointly supervised by Cote d’Azur University and Sousse University (Tunisia), Centre for Studies and Research in Administrative, Constitutional, Financial, and Fiscal Law (Nice), 22 December 2023; Hédia Brik Mokni, “L’exercice des libertés politiques en période de transition démocratique. Cas de la Tunisie,” PhD dissertation, DESPEG, CERDACFF research unit, Cote d’Azur University, 7 September 2016.
  22. François Rangon, “Société civile: Histoire d'un mot,” in: Jacques Chevallier, François Rangeon & Philippe Dupire (eds.), La société civile, [Texte imprimé]: [Rapports du colloque]/ [Organisé par le] Centre universitaire de recherches administratives et politiques de Picardie, [Amiens, 25 octobre 1985] (Paris: P. U. F., 1986), p. 9.
  23. Azmi Bishara, al-Mujtamaʿ al-Madanī: Dirāsa Naqdiyya (Doha/Beirut: ACRPS, 2018), p. 66.
  24. Michael Bernhard, “Civil Society and Democratic Transition,” East Central Europe: Political Science Quarterly , vol. 108, no. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 307-326.
  25. The Tunisian political literature does not offer a precise meaning for “state prestige”, but it generally refers to the restoration of state authority after a period in which its ability to carry out its decisions and compel citizens to comply with them has been compromised. It refers to the state’s ability to command a greater measure of fear, respect, and appreciation. In revolutionary contexts, it indicates a significant degree of veneration for state symbols, specifically its senior officials, and obedience to their orders. In this sense, “state prestige” has begun to assume serious concrete dimensions that threaten public and even individual freedoms, especially with the issuance on Law 54/2022. See: “Law 54/2022 of 13 September 2022 on the suppression of crimes involving information and communications systems,” Dcaf – Centre for Security Sector Governance, accessed on 11/8/2024, at: https://tinyurl.com/tk448kah
  26. A key slogan in Beji Caid Essebsi’s 2014 presidential campaign was the restoration of the stature of the state, which had been weakened and had lost authority vis-à-vis protest movements and a strong civil society. The security vacuum, too, fostered a climate conducive to challenging the state and disobeying its authority. President Kais Saied, for his part, implicitly viewed civil society as a competitor of the state, a factor that weakened it, and a barrier to the extension of state authority. He thus adopted adversarial positions toward associations and organizations. For more, see: Azmat al-Ajsām al-Wasīṭa: Dirāsāt fī al-Ḥāla al-Tūnisiyya (Tunis: Centre for Strategic Studies on Arab North Africa, 2023).
  27. IDES Research Group, “Société civile et démocratisation: Une étude comparative au nord et au sud,” Revue Tiers Monde , vol. 2, no. 178 (2004), pp. 443-464.
  28. The authority was created a few weeks after the fall of the Ben Ali regime pursuant to Presidential Decree 6/2011. See: “Presidential Decree 6/2011 issued on 18 February 2011 on the Supreme Body to Accomplish the Revolution Goals, Political Reforms, and Democratic Transition,” Dcaf – Centre for Security Sector Governance, accessed on 11/8/2024, at: https://urls.fr/wb25Ru
  29. “Law 88/2011 dated 24 September 2011 on Assemblies Organization,” Dcaf – Centre for Security Sector Governance, accessed on 11/8/2024, at: https://urls.fr/uOGNy
  30. There are an estimated 25,048 civic associations in operation. See: Centre for Information, Training, Studies, and Documentation on Associations, accessed on 26/8/2024, at: https://tinyurl.com/2xx74hjf
  31. Tunisia’s mining basin, which produces some 95% of the country’s phosphate, experienced near total paralysis during the decade-long transition, at significant financial cost to the country. Strikes and protests in the region, which entailed the destruction of equipment, received the unconditional support of civil society, particularly the UGTT and the LTDH.
  32. Some people broke with associations and organizations that developed a bad reputation due to luxury hotel meetings, paid junkets, and cronyism.
  33. Hatem Kahloun, “La société civile tunisienne à l’épreuve de la participation: Mobilisation, pression et compromis autour des projets de développement urbain,” Insaniyat , no. 90 (2020), pp. 99-120.
  34. Muhammad Abd al-Baqi al-Harmasi, al-Mujtamaʿ wa-l-Dawla fī al-Maghrib al-ʿArabī (Beirut: CAUS, 1987), p. 133.
  35. For more details, see: Karay al-Qasantini, al-Jamʿiyyāt bayn al-Taʾṭīr wa-l-Tawẓīf (Tunis: Faculty of Humanities and Arts, Manouba, 2009).
  36. It is widely believed that the Quartet (UGTT, LTDH, the Tunisian Bar Association, and the Tunisian Confederation of Industry, Trade, and Handicrafts) sponsored the 2013 national dialogue and so prevented the country’s slide into civil war. This idea has been widely disseminated by Tunisian and international media and political discourse that implicitly argues for the inflation, and even mythologization, of the Quartet’s role, particularly when these discourses invoke this as the reason that the Quartet was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015.
  37. Some analyses of the cleavage in civil society trace it to the early independence era, when all organizations and associations with some cultural or social ties to the old regime were abolished under the influence of modernization and the ideology of power. The rift was also manifested in the measures that abolished the system of Islamic endowments and suspended the activities of all associations and organizations with the word “Islamic” or “Muslim” in their names, including women’s associations and most charitable associations.
  38. Roberto Belloni, “Civil Society in War-to-Democratic Transitions,” in: Anna K. Jarstad & Timothy D. Sisk (eds.), From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 182-210.
  39. Michael Edwards, al-Mujtamaʿ al-Madanī: al-Naẓariyya wa-l-Mumārasa , Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Qadir Shahin (trans.) (Doha/Beirut: ACRPS, 2015), p. 66.
  40. Robert. D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 43.
  41. Cited in Belloni, p. 187.
  42. Gediminas Lankauskas, “Société civile religieuse et ‘effondrement moral’ de la nation lituanienne,” Anthropologie et Sociétés , vol. 32, no. 1-2 (2008), pp. 173-191.
  43. al-Harmasi, p. 133.
  44. The LTDH exemplifies an association that political parties vie to control and exploit in line with their own partisan visions and priorities. After its conference in October 2016, the LTDH saw a wave of defections that nearly paralyzed the organization after the Workers’ Party and the Democratic Patriots Party were accused of dominating it. This spurred some members to leave the association, including Vice-President Messaoud Romdhani, who resigned on 9 December. See: “Nāʾib Raʾīs al-Rābiṭa al-Tūnisiyya li-l-Difāʿ ʿan Ḥuqūq al-Insān Masʿād al-Ramaḍānī Yuʿlin Istiqālatahu,” Jomhouria , 9/12/2016, accessed on 12/6/2024, at: https://bit.ly/3RXMvl:h. The General Union of Tunisian Students is another case in point. As a result of persistent internal conflicts, it saw, in recent years, the concurrent leadership of two secretaries-general, each vying for legitimacy – a conflict that undermined its influence and ability to mobilize students to defend their causes. “Sectarianism”, as I use it here, refers to political behaviour that privileges the special interests of political groups within civic or mass organizations, overtly or covertly, over the collective interest, which should ostensibly prevail.
  45. Hatem Nafti, Tunisie: Vers un populisme autoritaire (Paris: Riveneuve, 2022).
  46. Larry Jay Diamond, “Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation,” Journal of Democracy , vol. 5, no. 3 (2008), pp. 4-17.
  47. During the internal electoral conferences of the LTDH, the National Bar Association, and the UGTT (for the latter, especially elections in the major sectoral unions for education, transportation, and health), the influence of parties can be gauged by the number of seats they win on internal leadership bodies.
  48. “Amīn ʿĀmm al-Ittiḥād Yaʿtarif: Lam Natruk al-Islāmiyyīn Yartāḥūn!,” Meem Magazine , YouTube, 2/5/2023, accessed on 11/8/2024, at: https://bit.ly/3xPlfyt
  49. Al-Kamour was a protest movement that emerged in the far south of Tunisia (the Kamour region, Tataouine) to defend the region’s rights to petroleum resources. After managing to shut down the oil fields for a prolonged period, it disappeared when Saied rose to power in 2019 and many of the movement’s leaders became supporters of the president.
  50. Numerous protest movement leaders became supporters of President Saied, either after the 2019 elections or the coup of 25 July 2021.
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