The Theory of Rational Choice and the Alternatives in Foreign Policy and International Relations

Authors

  • Author

  • Marwa Albadri Helwan University, Helwan

Keywords:

Rational Choice, Utility Theory, International Relations, Foreign Policy

Abstract

The study centers on a major problem related to rational choice theory and its applications in international relations and foreign policy. It asks whether the selection process is subject to the principle of maximizing benefit according to this theory, or is subject to other principles, psychological processes and cognitive biases. The study reached conclusions that confirm that the selection process is in fact subject to a non-standard process; that is, it is not subject to continuous choices to benefit maximization, but there are other factors that lead to the selection of risk over gain, and here the psychological aspects overlap with the rational aspects in influencing the choice. This reveals that it is not possible to separate the school that focuses on the psychological aspects of the decision maker and the school that focuses on rational calculations, but rather that the two can be combined together within the framework of alternative theories complementary to rational choice theory, such as the perception theory.

Author Biography

  • Marwa Albadri, Helwan University, Helwan
    Professor of Political Science, Helwan University, Helwan, Egypt.

References

  1. هي إحدى نظريات الاختيار العقلاني التي تشير إلى تعظيم المنفعة وتقليل الخسارة أو التكلفة.
  2. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, "Rational Choice and the Framing of Decision," The Journal of Business , vol. 59, no. 4 (1986), pp. 252 - 275.
  3. Jack S. Levy, "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice and International Relations," International Studies Quarterly , vol. 41, no. 1 (1997), pp. 88 - 89.
  4. Jack S. Levy, "An Introduction to Prospect Theory," Political Psychology , vol. 13, no. 2 (1992), p. 175.
  5. Levy, "Prospect theory," p. 89.
  6. Ibid., p. 90. شكل يوضح دالّة القيمة الافتراضية المصدر: Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," Econometrica , vol. 47, no. 2 (1979), p. 279.
  7. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," Econometrica , vol. 47, no. 2 (1979), p. 268.
  8. Levy, "Prospect theory," p. 91.
  9. Kahneman & Tversky, "Prospect Theory," p. 265. قدّم كاهنيمان وتفيرسكي أمثلة عدة لتوضيح تأثير عامل التأكيد أو التأكد، ففي مثال افتراضي للاختيار بين بديلين (أ) و (ب)، حيث تشير (أ) إلى فرصة للفوز ب 5002 دولار وباحتمال 33 في المئة، وللفوز ب 4002 دولار باحتمالية 66 في المئة، وللفوز بلا شيء باحتمالية 1 في المئة، ويشير البديل (ب) إلى فرصة للفوز ب 4002 دولار فوزًا مؤكدًا، اختار الأفراد البديل المؤكد وهو البديل (ب) بنسبة 82 في المئة.
  10. Ibid., pp. 268 - 269.
  11. Tversky & Kahneman, "Rational Choice," pp. 265 - 270.
  12. Levy, "An Introduction," pp. 178 - 179.
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  14. Levy, "An Introduction," pp. 178 - 179.
  15. Siegwart Linderberg, "The Method of Decreasing Abstraction," in: James S. Coleman Thomas & J. Fararo, Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and Critique (Newbury: Sage Publications, 1992), pp. 7 - 8.
  16. Ibid., pp. 12 - 13.
  17. Ibid, pp. 14 - 15.
  18. Byoung Won Min, "Understanding International Hegemony: A Complex Systems Approach," Journal of International And Area Studies , vol. 10, no. 1 (June 2003), pp. 28 - 29.
  19. Rose McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigun Press, 2001), p. 18.
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  25. هناك الكثير من الحالات في العلاقات الدولية التي تتبنى فيها الدولة التوجه الثاني، وهو توجه كراهية الخسارة أو قبول المخاطرة من أجل تجنب المزيد من التدهور في الوضع الراهن وهي: أ. كراهية الخسارة Aversion Loss أو قبول المخاطرة Risk Acceptant من الممكن أن تدفع الدولة في ظروف الأزمات إلى اتخاذ أفعال وقائية وقبول المخاطرة المتضمنة في الحرب الوقائية إذا كان لدى هذه الدولة حالة من حالات اليقين أو التأكيد بأن الدولة العدو على وشك البدء بالضربة الأولى، وهنا فإن الدولة الأولى وفقًا لفرضية كراهية الخسارة في نظرية التصور سوف تشن حربًا وقائية حتى إذا كانت نظرية المنفعة المتوقعة في تلك الحالة تدعو إلى السلوك التقييدي من الدولة الأولى. ب. كذلك تساعد كراهية الخسارة أو قبول المخاطرة في تفسير قيام الدول باتباع سياسات فاشلة على مدى أطول مما تتوقعه نظرية المنفعة المتوقعة، وذلك على أمل استعادة الوضع الراهن أو استعادة مكاسب سلبية. ج. من الأمور التي تفسر بتوجه قبول المخاطرة أن الدول من الممكن أن تشترك في فعل فيه مخاطرة ضد أعداء خارجيين؛ وذلك من أجل أن يقوم القادة السياسيون بتأمين أوضاعهم الداخلية ضد معارضين داخليين إذا كان الوضع الداخلي في حالة تدهور يقيني أو مؤكد.
  26. Thomas Bauer & Ralaph Rotte, "Prospect Theory Goes to War: Loss Aversion and the Duration of Military Combat," SELAPO, University Munich, Sonderforschungsbereich , vol. 386, no. 97 (1997), pp. 1 - 2.
  27. Ibid., p. 5. Player (x) انقلاب (نكوص) تعاون 3 , 3 تعاون Player (y) ,24 انقلاب
  28. Jeffrey D. Berejikian, "Model Building with Prospect Theory: A Cognitive Approach to International Relations," Political Psychology , vol. 23, no. 4 (2002), p. 767.
  29. Ibid.; Robert Jervis, "Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence," World Politics , vol. 41, no. 2 (1989), pp. 187 - 188.
  30. Berejikian, p. 767. المصدر: Ibid., p. 768.
  31. Jeffrey D. Berejikian, "A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence," Journal of Peace Research , vol. 39, no. 2 (2002); pp. 173-174; Berejikian, "Model Building," p. 768.
  32. Berejikian, "A Cognitive Theory," pp. 174-176; Berejikian, "Model Bulding," pp. 768-770; Gray Schaubetr, "Deterrence, Compellence and Prospect Theory," Political Psychology , vol. 25, no. 3 (2004), pp. 391-394,
  33. Berejikian, "Model Building," pp. 769-770; Berejikian, "A cognitive Theory," pp. 178 - 180.
  34. Berejkian, "Model Building," pp. 769-770; Jervis, pp. 187 - 189.
  35. Berejikian, "Model Bulding," pp. 771 - 773.
  36. Ibid., pp. 770 - 771.
  37. Ibid., pp. 773 - 774.
  38. Jeffrey D. Berejikian, "Model Building," p. 774; George W. Downs, David M. Rocke & Peter N. Barsoom, "Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation," International Organization , vol. 50, no. 3 (Summer 1996), pp. 380-382, 397 - 399.

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Published

2019-11-01

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Vol. 7 No. 041 (2019): Issue 041

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Studies

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