The Possible and the Impossible in Nietzsche’s Worldview

Abstract

This study tries to move away from the current logical approach to the theory of "possible worlds", in an attempt to investigate the subject according to Nietzsche. It starts with the author's understanding of some views that this approach is not suitable, and of others who dispute this choice on the basis of opposition to the claim that Nietzsche, with his hostility to logic, reason, and all rational or philosophical truth, is unable to entertain a logical view of his understanding of the world, whether because of his demolition of counterpart worlds erected by philosophers before him, on the basis that they are idols, or in his foundation of his own possible world. The defense of this supposed opposition required that the author rely on what is known by logicians as dialectical argumentation, that is the search for proofs to rebuff this claim and found the legitimacy to talk about possible worlds for Nietzsche – the subject of the paper. This study does not seek to provide an arbitrary projection of logical interpretation onto Nietzsche's philosophy, but rather attempts to apply the new developments in the logic of research approaches that aim to reveal submerged elements in Nietzsche's critique of the concept of the world. The paper puts forward the following theories: the relative possibility of a real world according to Plato; the unlikelihood of a real world according to the priest; the rational impossibility of a real world in Kant's conception, the total impossibility of a real world according to positivism, and finally the radical possibility of a world after putting an end to parallel worlds—the idealist possibility.