Toleration: An Impossible Virtue?

Abstract

In this article, Bernard Williams asks whether the concept of toleration can be considered a true moral value rather than just a pragmatic practice. He explains that toleration often arises not from deep respect but from skepticism, indifference, or a balance of power. However, liberal pluralism offers a more principled basis: it frames toleration as part of a political system that values individual autonomy. In this view, the state remains neutral among conflicting moral or religious views, allowing each person or group to live according to their beliefs – so long as they do not impose them on others. Still, Williams points out a major difficulty: those who oppose liberal values, especially autonomy, may not see any reason to support toleration. He questions whether liberalism can justify toleration to those who do not already share its core values. Even if toleration is grounded in autonomy, it still rests on a substantive view of the good, making it vulnerable to disagreement. Williams concludes that while toleration may not always stem from a moral virtue, it remains necessary in a diverse world. Its survival may depend less on shared values than on modern realities, like global interdependence, which can discourage fanaticism and encourage peaceful coexistence.